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economic history, of the neoclassical aggregate concept of capital fonnation,
 
Le., a simple percentage of GNP saved and invested and an aggregate fixed rate
 
of technical progress, and to emphasize the necessity of a deeper scrutiny of the
 
process of technological change by focussing on a distinct and varying aspect of
 
capital accumulation and technological change such as the process of technical
 
sectoral diffusion among countries. Three national cases of capital accumulation
 
are used to develop this approach: France, Spain and Italy. In each of them, the
 
growth of the iron and steel sector during the nineteenth century is examined.
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Introduction 
The rise of capital stock of an economy calls not 
only for a measurement of its size, but also for an organic 
and qualitative analysis of its functions and composition. 
Inquiry into the economic history of investment seeks 
answers to particular aspects of the process of accumulation 
of capital: its sectoral composition, its requirements for 
skills and quantities of labor, the entrepreneurial 
attitudes necessary for its adoption and management, the 
form and timing of its diffusion, and the geographical 
pattern of its settlement. 
Although rarely isolated for critical analysis, the 
fact is that somewhere in their structures all formal growth 
t"1 models contain as critical variables qualitative factors of 
this type. There is a consensus, then, that the study of 
technological change and its adoption may be one of the most 
t"\	 illuminating approaches to the history of economic 
development 
In spite of the need to introduce qualitative 
distinctions into the treatment of capital, most growth 
models, especially neoclassical models, deal with technology 
as an aggregate and exogenous variable. Neither the use of 
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the concept of "vintage" of capital to embody technology in 
the production functions of Solow and Abramovitz (1), nor 
the neutrality of technological change in Hicks are of much 
help for our understanding of the process of development in , 1 
, l
a historical perspective. \.-' 
The Harrod-Domar model (2), probably the best known
 
formulation of the dynamics of growth, provides us with a
 
good example of the treatment of technological change as an
 
aggregate and exogenous variable. In its general form the
 
central equation of the model is
 
s = (K/Q) g 
that is, the saving-income ratio, " s" , equals the
 
capital-output ratio times the natural rate of growth. The
 
model is designed to explain an exponential and balanced
 
process of growth under the conditions that output and
 
capital grow at a rate equal to the natural rate of growth,
 
"g". Technological change is simply embodied in the same
 
concept of natural rate of growth: the percentage growth
 
,]
per year of the labor supply expressed in "efficiency"
 
units, that is, natural labor units augmented by changes in
 
t e ch n0 1og y •
 
In other approaches, like that of Paul Samuel son
 
(3), innovation is almost equated to investment, i. e.,
 
people learn by trying new investments in which new
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technologies become embodied. 
In general then, most models of growth, especially 
neoclassical models, have dealt with technology not in an 
attempt to analyze its functions but rather as an instrument 
for negating or concealing the Ricardo-Marx law of declining 
rate of profit from capital deepening, and on the other hand 
for explaining the failure of the interest and profit rates 
to fall and of the capital-output ratio to rise. 
The intent of this study is to illustrate the 
limited usefulness, for the purposes of economic history, of 
the neoclassical aggregate concept of capital formation, i. 
e., a simple percentage of GNP saved and invested and an 
aggregate fixed rate of technical progress, and to emphasize 
the necessity of a deeper scrutiny of the process of 
technological change by focussing on distinct and varying 
aspects of the development of capital accumulation and 
technological change. In particular, the following analytic 
elements are introduced: 
1.	 Differentiation between invention and innovation: 
2.	 Use of the theory of technological diffusion: 
3.	 Study of resource location: 
4.	 Introduction of geography and transportation costs 
in the analysis: 
7 
5.	 Examination of the role of the public sector in the 
process of technological change; and 
6.	 Consideration of the spatial consequences that 
technological change brings through shifts in the ',i] 
location of capital. 
Three national cases of capital accumulation are 
used to develop this approach: France, Spain, and Italy. 
In each of them, the growth of the metallurgical sector 
during the nineteenth century is examined; and special :, 11 
emphasis is given to the absorption of British iron 
technology. In fact, the dynamics of the adoption of 
British technology in the iron industry in our three cases 
'1 
constitutes the central core of this essay. J 
Several theoretical considerations underlie this
 
analysis. In the temporal context of this paper - the
 \J Industrial Revolution of Continental Europe - Gerschenkron's
 
digression on the relative advantage of the "late corner"
 
over the "leader" lends meaningful insights into the
 
sequence and timing of the diffusion of technology. Whether
 
the use of more advanced and efficient equipment allows the
 
follower to overcome the initial advantage of the leader who
 
'I 
pioneers technological change will depend in our three cases 
.	 
.J 
on the behaviour of the institutional protagonists of
 
innovation: the entrepreneurial class and the public
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l	 sector. While France could count on a well-developed group 
of private businessmen and upon clear incentives of her 
government Italy had to rely almost exclusivly on the 
initiative of the public sector: while Spain lacked both 
strong private and pUblic entrepreneurship. 
Another controversial aspect of technological change( .. 
is the distinction between original invention and subsequent\' 
imitation, and differences with respect to the nature and 
form that the diffusion process assumes. As we shall seer 
the theory of diffusion permits us to make four types of 
judgments· (a) about the form of the diffusion process ­
its I inear or wave-l ike form: (b) about its na ture is 
diffusion a continous process or a series of discrete( 
\	 events?: (c) about the vehicle of technology's diffusion, 
diffusion process into stages or periods. 
The metallurgical techniques developed on the 
British side of the English Channel during the eighteenth 
century remained, for the most part, a British patrimony 
from which the Continent did not benefit until much later. 
Factors relating to the structure of supply, the 
insufficiency of demand, the organization of trade and 
transport, political conditions, natural resources, 
international trade, and entreprenurial attitudes accounted 
9 
for most of the causes of this delay.~J 
However, the historical situation at the end of the 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries also 
acted as a hindrance to the process of emulation of Britain 
by Continental European producers. 
The Continental System and the relative isolation 
that it brought to the countries Under Napoleonic control 
stimulated the advance of some technologies(as, for example, 
the Leblanc soda process) and some industrial areas, such as 
the manufactures of wool in Verviers and the cotton industry \( 
of Saxony. In general, however, the separation of Europe 
from the main source of technological innovation of the time 
and the lack of economic stimulus and competition resulted, 
on balance, in a retardation of the continental economies 
with respect to Britain. The following table shows the pre 
and post-bellum relative positions of Britain and France in 
terms of their general industrial indexes and the 
development of their two main sectors - cotton textiles and 
iron (in tons): 
--- ---------
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Percentage
1792 1815 Increase 
-----------------_._----------------------------------------
Great Britain 
Industr ial Index 
Cotton Consumption 
Pig Iron Prod uction 
France 
Industr ial Index 
Cotton Consumption 
Pig Iron Prod uction 
Great Britain/France % 
Cotton Consumption 
Pig Iron Production 
100 176 76 
12.240 36.240 196 
104.000 306.000 194 
100 122 22 
5.400 14.000 159' 
46.000 112.000 143 
227 259 14 
226 273 20 
Sources: Based on WaIter G. Hoffman, British Industry 
1700-1950, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955 p. 331; 
P. Deane and W. Cole British Economic Growth 1688 
-1959, Cambridge university Press, 1962, p. 5~ 
W. W. Rostow How l! All Began, New York McGraw­
Hill, 1975, p. 165; J. Marczewski "The Take-off 
Hypothesis and French Experience" The Economics of 
Take-off into Sustained Growth, W.-W: Rostow (ed:T, 
New York:~ Martinis Press, 1963, pp. 123 - 125. 
B. R Mitchell European Historical Statistics 1750­
1950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, 
pp. 427-428. Project Mulhall, University of Texas. 
The processes and the new types of machinery 
developed by the English and Scottish inventors and 
entrepreneurs had still to wait more than two decades to 
take root on the Continent, and even then, the process of 
their generalization was slow, irregular and plagued with 
setbacks. 
11 
To trace the expansion of British innovations from 
the crossing of the Channel until their adoption in the 
southern regions of Andalucia and the Island of Sicily is 
basic to an understanding of the economic history of (J 
Continental Western Europe in the nineteenth century. 
The new technologies and inventions were the product 
of the Scientific Revolution that had begun in the XVI 
.-]. 
f 
century. The outcome of the Scientific Revolution was the 
generalization of the idea that Nature was susceptible to 
being altered and manipulated in a controlled and planned 
manner by human beings. 
Nevertheless, the increase in the pool of knowledge 
and technological skills that occurred first in Britain and 
then in the rest of Europe was not by itself to produce the 
spectacular increase in output and the social transformation 
that we know today as the Industrial Revolution. A linking 
factor was missing: the adoption of scientific innovations \' J 
to the current industrial processes and the undertaking of 
the economic risks implied. This role was played by a new 
entrepreneurial middle class whose varying success from 
country to country in estimating the potential demand for 
the new products and processes, and the profits implied in 
their use conditioned the different development among -. -, 
J 
countries in the continent. 
! 
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Of course, other important factors acted as 
immediate causes of the different economic trends among the 
countries on the continent. The uneven agricultural 
development was one of them. While in Britain, some parts 
of the Low Countries and in the area near Paris a set of new 
techniques and pattern of land holding had been introduced, 
the rest of France was still trying to implement the social 
changes brought about by the French Revolution of 1789, and 
still more backward countries such as Spain and Italy had to 
wait until the l840's and l850's for a complete removal of 
( 
\ the Ancient Regime's agricultural structure and techniques. 
The different endowment of infrastructure and 
natural resources were decisive too. The availability of 
cheap transportation was a factor fostering economic 
development in the British Islands and some of the 
Continental countries, while in the Mediterranean Peninsulae 
the characteristics of transportation were, and still are, a 
deterrent to efficient commerce and communications. 
The quantities and spatial distribution of 
resources, energy, and raw materials played an important 
role in the timing of the implementation of the different 
technologies in the Continent. Facts like the availability 
of hydraulic energy in France have much to do with the 
relative tardiness in the adoption of steam power in 
textiles and metallurgy, and the lack of iron-ore and coal 
in Italy accounted for much of the backwardness of the 
13 
Italian iron and steel industry. 
Political factors were important as well. The 
centralization of administrative functions, the different 
degrees of democracy and, above all, the economic policies 
adopted by the states conditioned substantially the ways in 
which Europe developed. 
All these conditioning factors are reflected in the 
iron and steel industry. Metallurgical technology had had a 
protracted development prior to the industrial revolution. 
The first written works on technology dealt precisely with 
problems of minerals and metallurgical technology. As far 
back as the sixteenth century we have works on the subject: 
La Pirotechnia of Vanuccio Biringuccio was published in 
1540; the classic De Re Metallica of Agricola, appeared in 
1556; El Tratado de los Metales of Alvaro Alonso Barba was 
published in Spain c.1600 and became so well known 
throughout the world that even today it is used as a 
reliable handbook. 
Nevertheless, metallurgy, like many other fields of 
technology, did not begin a rapid expansion until experiment 
and planned research were applied in a systematic manner. 
It was the generalization of modern scientific methods that 
laid down the principles of modern steel-making. 
In analyzing the diffusion of these methods and 
processes we will proceed as follows. In the first place, a 
"J ! 
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brief history of the main technological improvements in the 
fiela of iron and steel making will be developed. It will 
( emphasize two aspects of the process: the technical 
Iv difficulties that the nineteenth century iron makers f~ced 
in order to solve the cost-and-quantity problems of 
production, and the availability of factors on the supply 
, I 
~ siae (raw materials, transportation, and 1abo r) that 
conditioned the growth of the metallurgical industry. 
Secondly, the spread of iron and steel innovations in 
\ ~ France, Spain, and Italy will be analyzed. The means of 
\ 
diffusion, the role of the governments, the enterpreneurial 
attitudes, and the relative prices of raw materials will be 
dealt with as the main variables of the problem. Finally, 
the theoretical aspects of the diffusion process will be 
analyzed. The vehicles of diffusion, and the form ana 
timing of the diffusion process itself are the main concerns 
of this part of the study. 
~ .... 
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An Abbreviated History of the 
Iro~-Smelting Techniques 
The Process of Smelting Iron 
The raw materials involved in the production and 
manufacturing of iron are iron-ore, coal(charcoal or mineral 
coal), and other auxiliary materials such as lime and silica 
(4) . The source of energy used (at least in the period 
considered) was human and animal first, hydraulic wheels in 
a second stage, and the steam engine at the end of the 
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. 
Iron-ore occurs in nature in multiple forms and 
varieties. Nevertheless, the most common forms found are 
those ores such as the haematites and magnetite whose iron 
content ranges between 60 % and 70 %. Iron deposits have 
always been frequent, although scattered, in almost all J! 
European countries. This dispersed occurrence, together 
with its lower price of transportation relative to coal, 
produced a shift in the location of furnaces toward the coal 
fields when the use of coal as fuel generalized; that is, 
after technology enabled the iron makers to get rid of some 
of the impurities of mineral coal, especially sulphur (5). 
15 
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Charcoal was the traditional fuel in all iron making 
processes until the time when mineral coal displaced it. 
The relative importance of charcoal in the smelting process 
(', 
I\, ' 
is denoted in the figures given by O. Johannson in his 
Geschichte des Eisens (6) In order to obtain one kilogram 
of smelted iron some furnaces used twelve kilograms of 
charcoal. 
The main obstacle to the use of charcoal was a rise 
in price caused by the progressive devastation of the 
European forests at a time when timber was needed for other 
purposes (especially shipbuilding), and the rising demand 
for food expanded arable land at the expense of the forests. 
Though some governments, especially the French, had tried to 
I" 
\ control irresponsible utilization of their forests, the 
scarcity of wood and its rising cost had become a real check 
on the iron industry. 
The alternative to charcoal was the use of mineral 
coal as fuel. Coal is a bulky commodity whose 
transportation cost has always been high relative to other 
production costs. Yet, coal's price was much lower than 
charcoal's in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. A 
great effort was applied, therefore, to overcome the main 
difficulty concerning its utilization as fuel~ that is, its 
high sulphur content. When sulphur contacted iron-ore 
during the smelting process, it was passed to the smelted 
iron. 
"._._-------------------------------------­
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Before the generalized use of the steam engine, 
hydraulic energy through the use of waterwheels, was the 
main source of power in the iron industry. The availability 
of this type of energy became one of the main location 
factors of the industry at that moment. 
During the eighteenth century and well into the 
nineteenth, most forges were subject to seasonal variations 
in the streams of water that produced discontinuities in the 
production. This, on the other hand, was in accordance with 
the rural and dispersed character of the industry at that 
time. It allowed the workers to occupy themselves with the 
summer crops, a task that they alternated regularly with the 
furnaces and forges (7). 
The requirements of modern methods of production \~J i 
exposed the main shortcoming of hydraulic energy: its lack 
of power to generate enough temperature for 
steam eng ine, which had been subject 
smelting. The 
to continuous .iJ 
improvements, came to solve this problem. Although its 
consumption of fuel was very high, the steam engine supplied 
a stream of hot air powerful enough to smelt iron-ore. 
Basically, the process that converts iron-ore into 
smelted iron is one of carbonation expressed in chemical 
terms as ;J 
Fe2 03 + C = Fe2 + CO + 02 
that is, iron oxide converts into iron by combining its 
-, 
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oxygen 
occurs 
with carbon. The temperature at which 
is about 1535 degrees centigrade (8). 
this process 
This threshold was hardly attained until recent 
times. The earliest furnaces yielded a low temperature 
unable to extract more than about sixty percent of the metal 
content of the iron-ore. The inefficiency of these 
primitive ovens can be seem in the proportions mentioned 
above(9): To obtain one kilogram of smelted iron 12 
kilograms of charcoal and 8 of iron ore were necessary. 
\ As the demand for iron grew during the eighteenth 
century, so did the capacity and, therefore, the height of 
the ovens. The "blowhoffen" or Catalan Forge was about 12 
feet tall and its average production about 1.5 tons a day 
(10). Its bigger size, the alternation of layers of fuel 
and iron-ore, and the stronger stream of air injected by 
means of bellows allowed a higher temperature and the 
obtention for the first time of liquid smelting. 
The alternation of layers of fuel and mineral 
allowed the continuous operation of the furnace. But as the 
ovens grew bigger and more layers of charcoal and iron-ore 
had to be burned, a source of greater energy was needed. 
r, 
~ \ The hydraulic engine provided the solution to this 
problem. The use of water power allowed the development of 
the blast furnace. with more powerful blasting the furnaces 
grew in size and became "haut fourneaus" or tall furnaces. 
19 
Frequent droughts and the seasonal variability of 
rivers made dependency on water power one of the main checks 
on the Continental iron industry during the nineteenth 
century. But in time the locational requirements of ] 
hydraulic power gave place to new problems concerning the 
transportation of the basic raw materials in the production 
of iron: mineral ore and fuel. ~l 
\) 
The Problem of Fuel 
The average output of the large blast furnaces at 
the end of the eighteenth century was about twelve tons per 
week. Yet, the proportions of the materials used had not 
changed substantially over the previous century and a half 
before. For the production of one ton of fluid iron it was 
necesary to use 40 cubic meters of wood. Grignon, a forge 
master of the Champagne area and author of several reports 
on metallurgy, estimated that the average proportion for the 
production of smelting in the "hauts fourneaux" in France 
was 1.75 pounds of charcoal to one pound of smelting (11). 
The exploitation of French forests was severely 
controlled in view of the "desboisization" of some regions 
of the country. Scarcity of wood caused the dependence of a 
good part of British iron production on Swedish imports of 
hard iron, cheaply produced with abundant charcoal in 
Sweden. Under these conditions, the remedy that the iron 
....J 
-l 
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industry needed was an alternative fuel, inexpensive and 
appropiate for the functions of smelting. 
Abraham Darby in 1713 was the first to smelt iron 
f successfuly with coke (12). Coke burns slower than charcoal\ 
and requires a stronger blast. The furnace has to be of 
larger size and the mechanism for pumping air more 
sophisticated and regular. These conditions seem to be the 
secret that led Darby to a successful production of' fluid 
iron in his workshop at Coalbrookdale. 
From Darby's experiment, the production of coke (13) 
and its use in coke smelting spread through all Britain and 
by 1788 almost eighty percent of total pig iron produced in 
the country was smelted with coke (14). 
\ 1 
Refining of Cast Iron 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century most pig 
iron produced in furnaces was refined into soft or malleable 
iron. The only known method was the oxidizing of carbon 
contained in the hard iron by heating it in a hearth. 
{, 
This method was slow, its yield extremely low, andI 
the resultant product was heterogeneus. L. Beck in his 
Geschitche des Eisens(15) remarks that the largest hearths 
21
 
installed in Europe toward the end of the eighteenth century 
yielded no more than 400 kilograms per day. Besides, as the 
refining process took place with direct contact of the metal 
and the coal, the coal had to be of high quality, and high 
quality coals were at that moment not easily available. It 
seems natural that the pressure of the demand for wrought 
iron and the scarcity of adequate coal made necessary the 
development of a new method of refining. 
Peter Unions in 1783 and Henry Cort in 1784 obtained 
patents for the production of malleable iron in "puddling 
ovens". Pig iron was placed, separated from coke, in a 
reverberatory(or heat-reflecting) furnace. A stream of air 
was injected from the top of the oven. The melted pig iron 
was periodically stirred or puddled with metallic dippers 
and when the process was finished the iron was hammered or 
passed through rollers to remove the slag. 
As metal never came into contact with the fuel, 
sulphuric impurities of coal did not passed into the iron, 
and the process yielded wrought, malleable iron without the 
inconveniences of the sulphuric component. L. Beck points 
out (16) that an expert puddler could make fifteen tons of 
iron in one week, or about five times more than the largest 
crucibles of the moment. This increase in output, in the 
context of a tremendous increase in demand for iron, was a 
decisive factor in the diffusion of the puddling and 
rolling, or "english method". 
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C The process of puddling did not yield iron as pure 
as that made through the "direct method", where small scale 
and manual operations allowed for an accurate control of the 
process; but the increase in demand and diversified 
applications of iron had changed substantially during the 
course of the industrial revolution. Iron was no longer the 
luxurious material that it had been up to the moment of the 
"machinist era" of late eighteenth century. 
The "english method" established a firm link between 
metallurgy and coal mining. From then, until new sources of 
energy were found, the site of coal-fields, and not of the 
iron-ore, was what mainly determined the location of the 
industry. 
\\ 
The rise of demand caused an increase in output (17) 
and this brought about some modifications in the smelting 
process, the most important of which was the hot blast 
furnace. The pre-heating of the air was patented by James 
B. Nielson, of Glasgow in 1828 (18) and used for the first 
time in Clyde in 1829. It consisted basically of injecting 
previously heated air into the smelting process. Heating 
the air to 60 degrees centigrade resulted in savings of more 
than 30 percent of the 'coal burned(19). The spectacular 
to \	 success of this system led to its rapid adoption, so much soi . 
(	 
that six years later almost all furnaces in Scotland were 
using the system. 
-------------------------------------------------------
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Innovations in Steel Making 
The two main products of the iron industry by the 
middle of the nineteenth century were puddled iron and 
crucible steel. The former, puddled iron, was soft, easily 
worked and welded, but lacking tensile strengh and not well 
suited for the necessities of construction, especially 
railway construction. Crucible steel, was apt for the 
latter purposes but its cost was high and the quantities in 
which it was produced very small. 
The problem was, then, how to combine the advantages ,] 
of the large scale production of the puddling process and 
the better quality of the crucible system to obtain a ductil 
and, at the same time, strong alloy. The answer to this 
problem came from Sir Henry Bessemer in 1854. During the 
Crimean War he was trying to develop a type of iron suitable 
I 
for gun barrels when he found a method of injecting air into I\J I,an egg-shapped steel vessel where molten pig iron was 
pour ed . 
The main advantage of the Bessemer "converter" was 
that the process of decarburation caused by the stream of 
air could be halted at any moment and, therefore, the exact 
content of carbon in the steel accurately controlled. 
(I iAnother technical advantage of the Bessemer converter was 
:.J 
that the oxidation of the impurities generated a very high 
temperature. For this reason, the result, whether steel or 
"J ' 
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I iron, was completly fluid and slag could be easily removed. 
The Bessemer process constituted a great step 
{ I forward relative to the old methods for making steel. In a 
I 
i 
puddling furnace the halting of the process of decarburation 
at a given moment required numerous and highly skilled 
workers and the resulting product was of poor quality. By 
contrast, the Bessemer converter turned out, in its first 
versions, about five tons of steel in some twenty minutes in 
an operation that could be performed by just a few workers 
with little training. Now just two or three converters\ 
could feed a regular-size blast furnace in its refining 
operations (20). 
The Bessemer system had one serious shortcoming: it\ 
could not eliminate the sulphuric impurities of pig iron 
and, therefore, could only be used with iron-ore free of 
sulphuric components. This requirement triggered efforts to 
find an alternative method capable of making steel from a 
phosphoric mineral. 
It was not until almost thirty years later that this 
problem was fully solved. In the meantime other 
developments occurred. The most remarkable of these was the 
method developed by the engineer C. W. Siemens (21). It 
consisted of a hearth to which he applied the "regenerative" 
principle to recover wasted heat. 
25 
The Siemens hearth could work with pig iron and 
scrap or with scrap alone while the Bessemer method required 
molten pig iron that had to be smelted separately at an 
extra cost. The operation of Siemens open-hearth was much 
slower than the Bessemer converter. The normal time taken 
by the converter was about thirty minutes while the 
open-hearth furnace took anything from six to twelve hours 
( 22) • This longer time allowed closer control over the 
quality since samples could be taken from the metal at 
desired intervals and the necessary corrections could be 
made. Moreover, as a byproduct, the recovery of wasted heat .] 
produced fuel savings of about 70 percent with respect to 
former methods (23). 
The main problem in the manufacturing of steel, 
namely the elimination of sulphur, was still present. As of 
the late 1670's no definitive solution had been reached to 
surpass the Bessemer and Siemens methods. 
It was not until 1879 that Sidney G. Thomas, an 
amateur with little practical knowledge of the industry, 
introduced in the converter a lining made of limestone and 
dolomi te. The chemically basic composition of this mixture 
made the phosphorus impurities pass into the slag and were 
eliminated with it. 
After the first experimental attempts in South 
Wales, the method spread rapidly; and its success shifted 
'J 
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once again the relative value of the different sources of 
iron-ore from the sulphur-free heamatites to the more 
abundant phosphoric ores. 
The last improvement to be mentioned here is that 
which combined the "basic" Thomas method with the 
open-hearth of Siemens. This combination, tried for the 
first time in Le Creusot in 1880 (24), increased the already 
high quality of the Siemens steel by getting rid of its 
phosphoric content. 
,\ 
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III 
The location of raw materials (J'I, 
for steel making l~ Southern Europe 
\ 
Sources of Coal 
Coal fields of southern Europe in the nineteenth 
century were subject to a set of influences that altered the 
relative value and the conditions of exploitation of the 
mines. These influences were: A) technological change that 
altered the exploitation techniques and allowed some 
reserves to come into use and rendered others obsolete; B) 
improvements in transportation technology and diffusion of 
new methods for hauling bulk materials which altered the 
accessibility of the markets; C) increases in reserves due 
to discoveries of new deposits; Dj changes in political 
borders of the countries that altered the availability of 
coal in some regions; E) the different degree of commercial 
protectionism of the European economies; and F) I above all, 
the abundance, low price, good quality, and availability of 
British coal combined with the cheapness of British 
freights. The interaction of these elements was decisive in 
the location and development of the iron and steel industry 
in the three countries France, Italy, and Spain - with 
27 ":J 
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which this paper is concern. 
French Coal 
The most important coal-fields of France formed a 
pattern that crossed the country from south to north. Apart 
from minor coal-fields(pyrenees, French Alps, Haute Savoie) , 
the four main sources of coal during the nineteenth century 
were the Alais coal-field, the coal-field of the Loire, Le 
Creusot-Blanzy field, and the coal basin of the north. All, 
except the last are on the border of the Massif Centrale 
and, as can be seen in figures number 1 and 2, they form a 
line going from the Pas de Calais to the Mediterranean. The 
axis of that line is formed by the rivers Rhone, Saonne, 
Loire, Alier, Seine, Oise, and Scheldt. This waterline is 
interconnected by a set of canals, the most important of 
which are the Bourgogne Canal, Canal du Centre, Canal de 
Nivernais, Canal d'Orleans, Canal du Nord, and Canal de 
St.Quentin. 
The coal-field of Alais was one of the earliest to 
be exploited. Its output was about one million tons at the 
mid nineteenth century and about two million toward the end. 
Before the construction of railroads, production from the 
field of Alais was sent to the cities of Nimes, Montpellier, 
Marseille and other places on the south coast(25). 
-----------------_._------------------------------
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The coal-field of the Loire was the most important 
producing region of the country until the North took the 
lead in the 1860's. Its main center,  
Saint-Etienne-Rive-de-Gier, produced 300,000 tons of coal by If 
the end of the eighteenth century. Every year about six 
.~ 
hundred coal loaded boats made the trip to the Paris region 
trave1ing down the Loire. Coal from Saint-Etienne also 
reached the southern regions of France and the Mediterranean 
by using the canal of Gisors to the Rhone and, from 1830, 
the railroad to Lyons. The output of the Loire's coalmines 
increased from about half a million tons at the beginning of 
the century to 3.5 million during the 1870's, four million 
tons at the end of the century (26). 
The location of the Saint-Etienne-Rive-de-Gier basin 
between the rivers Rhone and Loire gave a real advantage to 
this coal-field over the others, although the problems of 
transportation were still serious. Despite transportation 
problems, until the 1830's the Loire's coal was the cheapest 
of France (27). The average price of coal at the mine was 
6.80 francs per ton while it was 19.40 per ton, on the 
average, at the place of consumption. 
The third coa1-fie1d·of the Massif Centra1e is that 
of Le Creusot-B1anzy. It is located between the Saone and ]
the Loire close to the canal de Bourgogne(Seine-Saone). Its 
location therefore, allowed the coal of Le Creusot to reach 
the Paris market by water, particularly after 1830 when the 
-]', 
I 
I 
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railroad linked the fields to the Canal de Bourgogne.l. 
Intensive mining started in 1830. By 1860 production was 
about one million tons a year, by the end of the century 
J \ about two million tons (28).) 
The fourth and most important basin of France is the 
Nord coal-field (29). It extended from Valenciennes on the 
Belgian border in the direction of the Pas-de-Calais. It is 
an almost continuous field 190 miles long that stretches as 
far as Aachen in West Germany. 
During the eighteenth century only a small part of 
the field was known, that of Valenciennes, Nancine and 
Aniche. It was not until the 1830's that the richest part 
of the field was discovered. 
production expanded rapidly, especially after the 
completion of the canal of St. Quentin in 1827 and the 
lateral canal of the Oise in 1836 that allowed the coal of 
the North to regularly reach Paris. The North coal-field 
became the most important source of coal of France and one 
of the most important of Europe. The production of the area 
!( and its percentage relative to the French total was as 
follows: 
~' 
I. 
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Table 2 
Percentage 
of 
Output of North National 
Year Coal-field (Tons) Output 
1830 ......•. 400,000 26 
1847 1,236,000 ..•........... 24 
186U ....•. 2,500,000 ...........••. 30 
1880 ..... 10.455,000 ...........•.. 54 
1900 ...•. 20,380,000 61 
Sources: Based on R. B. Mitchell QE. 
Cit. pp. 360-2, and N. Pounds 
and W. Parker Coal and Steel in 
Western Europe~ndon: Faber 
and Faber Ltd. p. 21. 
Despite the rapid growth in output of the French 
coal mines, large quantities of coal had to be imported, 
mainly from Britain and Belgium, especially since the Act of 
1836 lowered import duties by half (30). 
:-] , 
-. ! 
I tal i an Coal 
The Italian Peninsula lacks adequate and abundant 
resources of coal. The dependence on coal imports and their 
transportation through the difficult geographic features of 
the country was one the main deterrents to the industrial J'development of Italy (31) . 
. -._------------------------------------, 
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( j As can be seen in graph 1, Italian output of coal 
was minuscule as compared to that of France and Spain. The 
following table shows the relative position of Italian coal 
I 
I 
production as compared to Spain and France: 
Table 3 
Total output of coal (thousand tons) 
Year I tal y (1) Spa in (2 ) Franc e (3 ) 1/2 % 1/3 % 
1861 34 331 9423 10 0.3 
1870 59 621 13,330 9 0.4 
1880 139 936 ....• 19,362 14.8 0.7 
1890 ....•. 376 ..•.... 1,210 26,083 31.0 1.4 
1900 .•.... 480 ••.•••. 2,657 ...•• 33,404 •....... 18.0 1.4 
Sources: Based on R. B. Mitchell 2£. Cit. pp. 360-4 
and Jordi Nadal El Fracaso de la Revolucion 
Industrial en Espana. Barcelona: Ariel, 1975. 
Statistical-Xppendix no. 5. 
Since Italy had to import about ninety percent of her supply 
of coal, local production was given national priority from 
the beginning of her industrialization. 
f\. The three Italian centers of coal production are the 
basins of the Arno and the Ombrone in Tuscany, the 
coal-fields of Sulcis in Sardinia, and the the coal-fields 
of La Thuile and Morgex in the Val d'Aosta. The first 
attempts to exploit the coal-mines of Tuscany were made in 
1840 (32), but without success. Reopened during the last 
1 
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/) third of the century, the mines provided the greatest part 
of localy produced Italian coal. In 1914 the output of the 
mines of Toscana was 500 thousand tons, that is, 66 percent 
of the national total. In the first years after the First 
World War their production had risen to 1500 thousand tons, 
that is, 70 percent of the national total at that time (33). 
The second important Italian coal mining region 
during the nineteenth century was the Val d'Aosta (34)~ The 
production of Morgex and Le Thuile were about 100 thousand 
tons at mid-nineteenth century, that is, about 30 percent of 
the national production at that moment (35). 
(
The last and least important coalfield of the three 
mentioned above is the Sulcis field in the mountains of 
I 
Iglesiente, at the southern tip of the island of Sardinia. 
Its exploitation began in the 1860's (36) and by the time of 
the First World War its production had risen to between 
\ I 
i fifty and eighty thousand tons. 
Spanish CoalI) 
~ 
Large scale extraction of coal in Spain began in the 
decade of the 1860's at the same time that the iron industry 
r 
was being formed and the railways were developing.
J J 
Yet, the dependence of Spain on coal imports was, as 
in the case of Italy, an important feature of her economic 
1' 
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.J 
history during the last decades of the nineteenth century. J 
As can be seen in graph 2, between the l860's and the end of 
the century Spain imported between 40 and 60 percent of her 
domestic coal. The effects of this dependence on foreign 
coal were, as will be explained later, among the main 
determinants in the location and subsequent development of 
the iron and steel industry of the country. 
lJ 
The three main coal centers of Spain form a pattern 
similar to that of France: an axis going from south to 
north in which the most important coal-fields are in the 
north and the least important in the south (see figure 3). 
These three coal centers are: Asturias in the north, 
Leon-Palencia in the center, and Cordoba-Ciudad Real in the 
south. 
The coal fields of Cordoba-Ciudad Real are located 
in the Gualdalquivir basin. The distance was short from 
these fields to one of the earliest focuses of metal 
industry of Spain, the foundries of Malaga; but the 
Penibetic mountains made transportation expensive and almost 
impossible. The main outlets for the coal of the region 
were the mercury mines of Almaden and the lead mines of 
Linares. 
Although of low quality, the coal of the 
Cordoba-Ciudad Real basin provided, as can be seen in table 
4, an important part of the national production • 
.--------- ._---------_.,-----------_.--------------, 
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r Table 4I 
Output and Impor ts 0 f Coal in Spain 
I' (absolute and percentage of domestic production)(thous and tons~ five years average)I 
Asturias-Leon Cordoba 
Years Spain -Palencia % -C. Real % Imports % 
1860-4 369 335 90 11 3 437 118 
1865-9 488 434 88 40 8 409 83 
1870-4 652 504 77 131 20 519 79 
1875-9 670 518 77 134 20 740 110 
1880-4 1031 710 68 216 21 1150 . III 
1885-9 999 655 65 236 23 1799 180 
1890-4 1225 695 56 295 24 1829 149 
1895-9 2116 1496 70 475 22 1736 82 
1900-4 2636 1823 69 619 23 2206 83{, 1905-9 3410 2528 74 696 20 2296 67 
1910-3 3622 2766 76 670 18 2615 72 
Source: Elaborated from Jordi Nadal Op. Cit. pp. 224-7. 
Asturias-Leon-Palencia was the most impor tant 
producing region of Spain as is shown in the table above. 
This region alone accounted for more than 70 percent of all 
\ I 
.\ coal extracted between the 1860's and First World War (37). 
The main problem of ~he Asturian mines was the high cost of 
hauling from the coal-fields in the mountains to the ports 
of the Cantabrian sea. This problem was in part solved by 
the opening of the road from the coal-fields of Langreo to 
the harbour of Gijon in'1842 and by the railway line that 
linked these same two places in 1855. Production was 
further encouraged by public pOficy: after 1833 coal-mining 
exempt from all taxes, and protective tariffs tried, with 
....._-_.__._._._---------------------------
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modest results, to prevent imports of foreign coal. A ] 
substantial increase in production, however, had to await 
the extension of railroads and the diffusion of the use of 
coke in the iron and steel industry during the decade of the ~) J 
1860 IS. 
As in the case of France and Italy, the subsequent 
development of coal mining in Spain has to be looked at in '] 
the light of the nineteenth century international coal 
trade. As will emerge, competition of British coal was the 
decisive factor in the development attained by the coal 
industry in Spain. 
Iron-Ore ] 
In all three cases - France, Spain and Italy the 
main fields of iron-ore are concentrated in a single region. 
These are the Lorraine in France, the Basque Country in 
Spain, and the island of Elba in Italy. 
Apart from other small deposits (38), the main 
French iron mines are located in Lorraine. This region, 
south of Luxemburg, between the rivers Mossele and Saar, 
produces low metal content ore with a high proportion of 
phosphorous. Consequently, until the "basic" Thomas system 
was invented in 1879 its output did not expand greatly. 
Thereafter production of iron-ore in Lorraine increased 
[ 
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dramaticaly (39): from 40 thousand tons in 1834 to 1.2 
million tons in 1870, 41 million tons in 1913 (40). 
In Italy, although some iron-ore was extracted in 
r
Val d'Aosta and Calabria and used for local consumption, theI 
island of Elba was, as noted above, the only significant 
Italian deposit. The iron-ore of Elba had a low phosphorus 
content and an adequate proportion of silica, therefore 
fitting the requirements of the technology prevalent before 
the diffusion of the Thomas system. This fact and the lack 
of internal demand in the Italian market caused most of the 
(, product to be exported. Only after the 1880's, i. e., when 
modern Italian metallurgy was established, was Elban 
iron-ore fully used in smelting and refining. 
In the case of Spain, large scale mining of iron-ore 
began in the 1850's in the northern provinces of Vizcaya and 
Santander. The iron-ore of this region has a high content 
of metal (52-58 percent) and a very low proportion of 
phosphorus so that the rise of the Bessemer system in the 
mid-1850's dramatically increased the demand for this type 
of mineral.1
I 
As in Italy, exports of iron-ore, especially from 
Vizcaya, played a decisive role in the development of 
Spain's iron and steel industry, a linkage explored later. 
Table 5, corresponding to the data represented in 
graph 3, exhibits the distribution of total national output 
J ., 
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of Spanish iron-ore between local consumption and foreign 
markets:  
JTable 5 
Production Exports 
Year (Th. Tns.) (Th. Tns.) prod./Exp. % 
1870 436 253 58 
1875 520 336 65 
1880 3,565 2,932 82 
1885 3,565 3,311 84 
1890 6,546 4,795 73 
1895 5,514 5,100 92 
1900 8,675 7,800 90 
Source: J. Vicens Vives Historia Economica 
de Espana. Barcelona: Edit. Vicens 
Vives, 1959. p. 601. 
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The diffusion of new metallurgical 
technologies in three national cases.  
First Case: France ] 
The growth of the French economy d ur ing the 
Napoleonic Wars illustrates well the need for sectoral and 
spatial economic analysis. Between 1793 and 1815 the index ] 
of France's industrial production grew 22 percent, and the 
cotton and iron sectors 159 and 143 percent respectively. 
Yet, vis-a-vis Britain, the almost three decades of war 
resulted in a widening of the pre-bellum gap between the two 
countries, in both output and, perhaps more important, in 
technology. 
British advantage in the iron industry was 
especially important. The momentum that the metallurgical 
sector had gathered in Great Britain during the last part of 
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century was such that it assured British supremacy as 
"ironmaster of the world" for most of the nineteenth 
century. 
In effect, between' the 1790's and 1815, Great 
Britain not only multiplied its output of iron by 3.7 (41), I]
but also radically altered the technical conditions of 
production. In contrast, although French iron production 
45 J' 
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[ 
/ jumped during the same period from 40,000 to 140,000 tons 
L (42), the methods of smelting, refining, and casting were 
not basically changed. 
f An aggregate treatment of the French iron industry's 
growth during these years is, therefore, unlikely to reveal 
either the inducements or the obstacles to the process. We 
need to consider other variables seldom accounted for in 
\ ' 
traditional growth models: the technological conditions of 
pre-Napoleonic France and their innovative capacity: the 
relations between Britain - the focus of innovation and 
i France: the protagonists of the adoption of new industrial 
\ 
methods: the role of the French government in the 
modernization of France's iron industry: and the 
availability, location and prices of the raw materialsI ' 
\ -
required for the new methods. 
Iron production in France took place in small forges 
often owned by signeurs in whose manors were located not 
only the furnaces but also the power(mainly streams) to 
blast them and the woods to fuel them. Sales were mainly 
local, ana the lack of adequatE transportation reinforced 
this pattern of small markets. The average worker at the 
furnaces was a part-time agricultural labourer whose crafts 
and skills were not suited to the hard and precise task of 
iron smelting and refining. Furthermore, the operation of 
the furnaces was subject to seasonal variation in the 
streams which, especially in the southern part of the 
47 
country, 
year. 
kept the furnaces inactive for a good part of the 
Under these conditions, the central feature of the 
French iron industry in this period was the effort to close 
the gap between France and Britain. This effort was mainly 
undertaken on the initiative of businessmen and ironmasters, 
but the French government also promoted the modernization of 
the sector by direct subsidies and grants. 
] 
l
.-.J I 
Travel to England and the acquisition of first- hand 
information on the new British methods was perhaps the most 
influential device in the process of modernizing the French 
iron industry. Even before the Napoleonic Wars a number of 
French technicians went to several parts of England to get 
acquainted with the industrial innovations on the other side 
of the Channel. 
'~J 
'.'. 
Table 6 shows only a few of the best known 
entrepreneurs and technicians whose investigative trips to 
England were influential in the technological development of 
France's iron industry: 
] 
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Table 6 
Name Year Method 
Gabriel Jars 1764 Coke-smelting
De Geussane 1773 " 
M. de la Houliere 1775 " 
Barthelmy Faujas c1780 " 
August E. de Bonard 1802 Coke smelting 
and puddl ing
Richard O'Reilly 1802 Puddling 
Francoise de Wendel c1816 Coke-smelting
\ I Etienne Calla " 
De Gallois-Chapelle " 
Georges Dufaud " 
P. A. Dufrenoi 1827 
Elie de Beaumont 1827 
Leon Coste 1830 
P. A. Dufrenoi 1833 Nielson's hot 
blast 
Schneider (jr.) 1840 Coke-smelting
Freder ic Le Play 1842 Huntsman cast 
steel process 
Sources: S. Milward and S. B. Saul The 
Development of th~ Economies-of 
Continental Europe 1780-1870. 
London: AlIen and Unwin Ltd., 1973. 
pp. 328-330. David S. Landes The 
Unbound Prometheus. Cambridge-:--
( . at the University Press, 1972. pp. 175-180. w. O. Henderson Britain 
\ I 
\..  and Industrial Europe 1750-1870. 
Leicester: Leicester University 
Press, 1972. pp. 38-62. A. Birch 
"Foreign Observers of the British 
Iron Industry during the Eighteenth 
Century" Journal of Economic 
History. XV, 1955-,-p. 31. 
At the same time that French enterpreneurs andr 
technicians went to Britain,  a number of British ironmasters 
and businessmen established themselves in France. Among the 
most famous British ironmasters that went to France were 
'l 
I~ 
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those listed in Table 7: 
Table 7 
Name Year Places of establishment 
William Wilkinson 1777 Indret (Nantes), Le Creusot 
Humphrey Edwards 1815 Paris 
Aar 0 n Iw1anby 1822 Charenton 
Daniel Wilson " " 
Radcliffe 1823 Paris 
James Jackson 1826 Saint-Etienne 
Jackson brothers 1830 Assailly 
Philip Taylor 1831 Vienne(Isere), Voulte(Ardeche) 
Source: W. O. Henderson Ope Cit. pp. 38-62 
In effect, one of the most important consequences of 
peace was the relaxation of the obstacles to the migration 
of artisans and technicians. Although the ban on taking 
parts and machinery out of Great Britain lasted until 1842, 
the obstacles to the outmigration of technicians were 
removed in 1825. It has been calculated that by that date 
more than two thousand British technicians were residing on 
-J I 
, 'the Continent (43). 
Thus, direct human relations first spread Britain's 
technological advances beyond its shores. For example, 
following the instructions drawn .up by John Holker, a 
Jacobite refugee technician, the French Government sent 
Gabriel Jars, in 1764, to England and Scotland to study the 
50 
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modern methods of iron production. On his return he tried 
to smelt iron in the British manner at his ironworks in 
Paris but without success. Nevertheless, in 1768 Gabriel 
Jars was instructed by the government to travel through the 
French provinces to advise local ironmasters on the new 
methods (44). 
In 1775 another French iron master, Marchant de la 
Houliere, obtained a travelling grant from the Langedoc 
Estates and the French government to inspect ironworks in 
the Midlands and North-east England. Using the services of 
the French ambassador in London, Marchant de la Houliere was 
responsible for one of the main catalysts in the 
modernization of the French iron industry: the invitation 
to William Wilkinson to go to France to establish a Royal 
cannon foundry at Indret, in the neighborhood of Nantes. 
In 1777, Wilkinson was paid by the French government 
to move to Indret and set up a plant of limited scale. By 
1780, Wilkinson initiated a study to determine the location 
of a smelting and refining plant to supply the foundry at 
Indret. Based on the availability of iron-ore and coal and 
the hope of the eventual completion of the Canal du Centre 
(Loire-Rhone), Wilkinson decided on the old ironworks of Le 
Creusot as the projected site. Under the direction of the 
French engineer Ignace de Wendel, the first furnace in the 
Continent to use coke successfully was fired at Le Creusot 
in 1785 (45). Yet, the Le Creusot experiment did not 
51 
survive 
resumed 
Frenchthe 
moreuntil 
Revolution and coke smelting was not 
years later when thethan thirty 
] 
Schneider family took over the company in 1833 (46). 
During the Napoleonic wars and the immediate postwar 
period, the technical improvements in the French iron 
industry proceeded slowly. Cort's system of puddling and 
rolling, for instance, was not even tested in France until 
the 1810's, three decades after its invention. 
The breakdown of communications during the war plus 
a policy of high tariff protection resulted in a pattern of 
rather isolated, small and self-sufficient markets in which J 
conservative ironmasters could make substantial profits 
,using obsolete equipment (47). Institutional barriers 
imposed by the British on the migration of technicians and 
machinery and the conditions of the French market further 
hindered the rapid introduction of new techniques. 
'~( 
On the demand side, the main incentives for the J 
spread of coke smelting were the substitution of iron for 
wood in textile machinery during the 1830's and the 
construction of railroads during the 1840's. A sign of the ] 
weakness of the demand for iron in the pre-railroad years in 
France is the fact that in 1830 more than 20 percent of the 
iron produced in France still went into the manufacture of 
plows. 
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The supply side of the French iron sector though, 
was the main constraint on the transition from charcoal to 
coke. One of the main deterrents to the adoption of 
coke-furnaces was their large fixed cost. In order to 
reduce average fixed costs, a coke-smelting blast furnace 
had to be operated continuosly, while the traditional 
charcoal blast furnace could be left inactive, responding to 
fluctuations of the demand. 
As C. Hyde has shown (48) for the case of British 
furnaces, the main element in the transition of French iron 
industry from charcoal to coke smelting was the relative 
proportions of variable costs. The cost of fuel was usually 
over 40 percent of total production costs (49) while wages 
and iron-ore were a comparatively small part. 
Until about 1848 the ample reserves of wood of 
France guaranteed an adequate supply of charcoal (50). This 
factor, together with the scarce development of coal mining, 
caused the price of charcoal to remain low, relative to the 
price of mineral coal. Table 8 below shows the output (in 
thousands of tons) of French firewood and the acceleration 
of its decline after the 1850's: 
----------- -------- ----------
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Table 8 '] 
Output of Percent 
Year Firewood Difference 
1803 - 1812 22.865 ]
1815 - 1825 21.730 14 
1825 - 1834 20.425 5 
1835 - 1844 21.420 6 
1845 - 1854 19.475 9 
1855 - 1864 18.085 7 
1865 - 1874 16.025 11 
1875 - 1884 14.225 11 
Source: T. J. Markovitch Histoire quantitative 
de l'economie francaise. Paris:lnstitut 
de Science Economique App1iquee, 1966. 
pp. 11 0 - 111. 
J 
In 1825 Le Consei1 General des Manufactures 
concluded in its "Rapport de Mi11eret sur l' exportation de 
charbons de bois d'I11e-et-Vilaine" that it was necessary to 
improve the conditions of the market in order to avoid the 
current overproduction of charcoal and its low price (51).  'J~,
,, 
I 
However, in 1844 a well informed professional 
magazine, Le Journal des Economistes, complained about the 
decline of charcoal production, the rise of its price, and 
,] 
warned about the problem of "l'importation de charbon de 
bois, venu notamment de Belgique et de Toscane" (52). 
The initial disadvantage of French coke is reflected J 
in the fact that during the 1820's its price at the 
metallurgical district of Saint-Etienne was twice as high as 
[ 
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in England (53). Yet, after the 1830's two factors reversed 
this situation: the decline in the production of charcoal 
and the improvements in coal mining and transportation, 
especialy from the Loire basin. 
The price of charcoal rose 25 percent between 1820 
and 1825 (54), and 55 percent during the 1830's (55), while 
the price of coal dropped about 23 percent during the same 
period. The evolution of the price of coal (in francs per 
ton) is shown in table 9: 
Table 9 
I (
\' 
( , 
\ . Source: F. Simiand "Etude sur le 
prix du charbon, en France 
et au XIXe siecle." L'Annee 
Sociologique. V, 1902. 
p. 17. 
Year 
1820 - 1824 
1825 - 1829 
1830 - 1834 
1835 - 1839 
1840 1844 
1845 - 1849 
Price 
of Coal 
12.08 
10.13 
9.70 
9.91 
9.50 
9.87 
As a result of the different trends in prices of 
coal and charcoal the initial advantage of charcoal was 
compensated for and surpassed by the rapid fall in the cost 
of coal-smelting. As had happened in Britain during the 
------------------------
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eighteenth century, from the decade of the 1850's the cost 
advantage of coke-smelting was well established in France. 
As an example of this process, table 10 below shows the 
selling prices of coke and charcoal smelted pig iron at the 
foundry of Fourchambau1t from mid-1850's to mid-1860's: ,] 
Table 10 
Selling Price of Pig Iron 
at the Foundry of 
Fourchambau1t 
Charcoal Coke 
Year Sme1 ted Smelted 
------ ------- -------  J 
1854 170 120 
1855 200 120 
1856 190 120 
1857 180 120 
1858 180 100 
1859 180 90 ]1860 170 90 
1d61 170 85 
1862 170 85 
1863 170 87 
1864 170 85 
1865 165 85 
1866 160 82 
Source: GUy Thui11ier Georges Dufaud et 
1es debuts du capita1isme dans 
la meta11urgie, ~ Nivernais, 
au XIX siec1e. Paris: Eco1e 
pratique-des Hautes Etudes, 1959. 
p. 91. 
)The new techniques - initiated in the 1820's by I '~I 
Ga110is at Terrenoire, Dufaud at Fourchambault, and Wende1 
at Hayange (56) - spread rapidly during the 1840's and 
~) 
J 
I 
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became predominant during the 1850's and 1860's. 
Table 11 below shows the evolution of the coke and 
charcoal smelting in France through the nineteenth century 
as well as the increase in the relative proportion of coke 
over charcoal: 
Table 11
L 
Coke-smelting Charcoal-smelting Percent coke 
Year (Thou. Tons) (Thou. Tons) over total 
r 
l 
1825 
1830 
1835 
5 
31 
49 
194 
194 
246 
2.5 
13.7 
16.6 
1840 82 321 20.3 
1845 193 305 38.7 
1850 176 230 43.3 
1855-59 546 353 60.6 
I :
t' 1860-64 1865-69 796 1105 269 156 74.0 87.4 
1870 1088 90 92.3 
1875 1332 116 91.9 
1880 1670 55 96.8 
1885 1602 29 98.2 
1890 1950 12 99.3 
\ 
\ Source: D. S. Landes Op. Cit. pp. 217 
A clear case of the external effects of new 
technologies is present here. As Fogel and Engerman (57) 
have shown for the case of American iron industry, 
improvements in productivity of charcoal smelting were 
induced by the advances in the design and operation of the 
coke-smelting "haute-forneaux". Using these refinements at 
...-.---_._----------------------------_._-----------
57 
his foundry of Fourchambault, George Dufaud was able to 
reduce expenditures on charcoal by 33 percent during a 
per i od, the 1830 ' s, when its pr ice was r i sing s ha r ply ( 58) . 
As a result of these technical externalities there 
was an expansion of plants using the older technology during 
the postwar period. The number of charcoal blast furnaces 
almost doubled in twenty years: from 357 in 1825 to 623 in 
1845. Even the old Catalan forges increased in number in 
the area of the Pyrenees and the Massif Central (59). 
As for the other major British invention, the 
puddling and rolling process, the sequence of its adoption 
on the Continent was somewhat different than in Britain. In 
Britain the puddling process was adopted more than half a 
century after the use of coke in smelting had been 
introduced, while on the Continent the use of coke in 
refining came first. This was apparently due to three 
causes: the economies of fuel and ore in refining are 
greater than in smelting; the initial cost of shifting from 
the direct method to refining with coal is much smaller than 
in smelting; and coal-refining was technically easier than 
coal-smelting due to the absence of direct contact between 
the fuel and the ore. 
The first puddling ovens were installed in France 
between 1810 and 1830 by the same ironmasters that adopted 
coke-smelting a few years later. One was installed in 
] 
] 
,] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
] 
I 
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f- Grossouvre in 1817 by Dafaud (60). It was followed in 1818 
by Francois de Wende1 in Hayange and in 1819 by de Ga110is 
in Saint-Etienne (61). By 1825 the British ironmasters 
II I Aaron Manby and Daniel Wi1son had established pudd1ing 
furnaces in Chanti11on-sur-Maine, Abainvi11e (Meuse Dept.), 
Raismes, Imphy (Nievre Dept.), Audincourt (Doubs Dept.), and 
La Chandeau (Haute Saone). 
The rapid expansion of the "British method" is' shown 
in table 12. It shows the number of pudd1ing furnaces and 
their production in metric tons: 
Table 12 
Year No. of Furnaces Production 
1818 
1821 
1823 
1826 
1827 
1845 
1848 
1882 
1 
9 
20 
150 
149 
453 
6000 
40000 
220000 
375000 
1000000 
{ ( 
Source: Elaborated from A. s. Mi1ward 
and s. B. Sau1 Op. Cit. pp. 
199-328. D. S. Landes Op. Cit. 
p. 176. E. L. Dunham The Indus-
trial Revolution in France 1815-
1818. New York: Exposition Press, 
1955. pp.129. N. J. G. Pounds 
Coal and Steel in Westen Europe. 
B1oomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1957. pp. 178. 
] 
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The primacy of puddling in the refining of iron ]' 
lasted until the implementation of the Bessemer and Thomas 
methods. In the meantime, puddling furnaces improved in 
efficiency and productivity. Their output capacity rose !]
from 300 to almost 600 tons per year between, 1825 and 1845 
( 62) • 
Nevertheless, refining remained a bottleneck in the 
'] 
iron i ndus try. The need for both physical strength and 
skill made the task of puddling difficult and impeded the 
expansion of the size of the furnace. Efforts to mechanize 
the process failed, because the operation needed to be cared 
for continuosly in order to separate the solid slag from the 
_metal. 
I 
JThe cost of building a reverberatory furnace large 
enough to process the output of three medium-size blast 
furnaces was, in the middle of the nineteenth century, about 
half a million francs (63), and this sum was large enough to 
discourage all but the most important ironmasters.  
Furthermore, as in the case of coke-smelting, the spread of 
the puddling and rolling methods was checked by the scarcity ] 
of adequate coal, skilled labor, as well as by the limited 
availability of iron-ore and-streams. 
By mid-nineteenth century the large scale production ] 
of low cost steel was required by' the rapid rise in demand 
for rails, machinery, tools, public works, and armament. 
i 
r 
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New engineering, sophisticated design, and the combination 
of precission and power of the new machine-tools required 
the use of an alloy with both strengh and ductility. Yet, 
i \ neither the puddling nor the "direct" process permitted 
large scale production of high quality steel at low cost. 
As noted earlier, the first method for mass 
production of low cost steel was devised by Sir Henry 
Bessememer in 1854. The first French Bessemer converter was 
installed in 1858 in Saint-Seurin sur L'Isle (Dordogne). It 
was followed by other converters in Imphy, Assailly, and 
Terrenoire. By 1869 there were 16 converters installed 
(64). From then on the Bessemer and Siemens-Main processes 
became the foundation of French steel making. On the eve of 
the First World War, more than a third of the country's 
crude steel was made in Bessemer converters and as late as 
1930 the process still accounted for more than a fourth of 
( total production (65). 
\ I 
\ 
However, the dependence of the Bessemer and Siemens 
methods on non-phosphoric iron-ores required the importation 
of foreign ores and impeded the full scale exploitation of 
the largest deposits of iron-ore in Europe, those of The 
Lorraine. Thus, with the invention in 1879 of the Thomas 
"basic" converter, which could use those ores, large amounts 
of inexpensive ore became available and the French iron 
industry gained a sudden momentum. 
J-
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The first "basic" French converters were installed 
in Le Creusot(1879), Mont-Saint-Martin (1880), and Hayange 
(1881). The development of production by the Bessemer and 
Thomas methods is shown in table 13 in which output is 
expressed in thousands of tons: 
Table 13 
Bessemer and 
Year Siemens-Martin Thomas 
1865 40 
1 B7 3 150 
1879 330 
1885 190 
1890 250 
1895 380 
1900 650 800 
1913 1600 3000 
Source: Elaborated from B. R. Mitchell 
European Historical Statistics 
1750-1970. London: McMillan, 1975 
p.400. o. S. Landes Op. Cit. 
p.257. 
p.179. 
N. G. Pounds Op. Cit. 
The introduction of Bessemer and Thomas' converters 
drove prices of steel down about 80 or 90 percent between 
the early 1860's and mid-1890's. At the same time the 
demand for steel increased substantially due mainly to 
armament construction and the substitution of steel for iron 
rails starting in the 1870's. 
"] 
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Second Case: Spain 
As in France the impetus for industrialization in 
Spain came from abroad. Nevertheless, the spanish case is 
somehow atypical due to the isolation in which the Peninsular ( 
lived and also due to its geographical situation within 
Europe. 
The Spanish experience can not be understood inl..· 
terms of conventional highly aggregated growth analysis. 
One must, in particular, take into account the following 
particular circumstances: the existence of wide differences 
in regional endowment of entrepreneurship and raw materials; 
the influence of geographical barriers to diffusion; and the 
marked shifts in the location of industry. The use of the 
diffusion theory and the inclusion of locational 
considerations are particularly important for the study of 
Spain's nineteenth century industrialization. 
In general, the time-lag in the adoption of new 
techniques on both sides of the Pyrenees was of some forty 
years. With the exception of some local industries 
that had earlier acquired new technologies{notably, the 
cotton textile industry in Catalonia), the beginning of the 
industrial modernization of Spain occurred the decade of the 
1830's. During these years the fall of the absolutist 
r monarchy gave place to a new liberal government that 
implemented the economic ideas of the emerging middle 
63 
class(66}. rfhe disentailment of mortmain states expanded ]
the cultivated land and, wi th it, the demand for new 
products and tools (67). Population growth and improvements 
in the communication network provided the bases for a small,  
although growing, national market for modern products. ] 
Among these products, cotton yarn and iron were of 
special significance. The mechanization of the textile ]industry and the introduction of more efficient methods of 
iron smelting expanded the demand for cotton yarn and iron 
tools. These two sectors were the basis for the early phase 
of industrialization in Spain and created the two first  
nucleii of industrial development in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country. 
The evolution of these two sectors differed. The ] 
textiles of Catalonnia had a long tradition that stemmed 
from the eighteenth century, so that the modernization and 
accelerated growth of the sector proceeded from a rather ] 
well developed industrial base. On the other hand, the 
Spanish ironworks were primitive furnaces, and Catalan 
forges were scattered throughout the country, supplying Jtheir products to limited markets with low levels of demand. 
The scarcity of wood made production expensive, and the 
seasonal changes of water streams made it irregular. 
JToward the end of the eighteenth century there were 
about one hundred and fifty ironworks in Spain that produced 
] 
----~---_.~~--~_.~-~~ 
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some fifteen thousand tons of pig iron (68), that is, about 
one fourth of the French production in the same years. As 
compared to the smelting and refining processes prevalent in 
the rest of Europe, the Catalan forge was inefficient in its 
consumption of fuel and expensive in its cost of production, 
but it was the technological stage that best fitted the 
conditions of demand and the structure of the market in 
Spain at the time. 
The first modern metallurgical methods implemented 
in Spain coincided with the extension of the cultivated land 
produced by the disentailment of mortmain states. Since the 
Enclosures Law of 1836 until the 1860's almost ten million 
new acres were brought into cultivation (69), that is, 5 
percent of the total cultivated land of the country. The 
increase in agricultural output required a larger supply of 
the traditional metallurgical products: plows, horse-shoes, 
tools, etc. 
More important for iron demand was the mechanization 
of the Catalan textile industry that accelerated during the 
1830's. By 1842 there were 4,583 textile establishments in 
Catalonia using 37,640 looms and more than a million 
spindles (70). The following figures suggest the importance 
of the Catalan textile industry as a market for the iron 
industry: The construction of a spinning jenny of 52 
spindles required more than 3 tons of iron; a "self-acting" 
spinning machine of SOU spindles contained more than 4.5 
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J 
tons of iron, and the iron embodied in the shaft of a loom o 
was more than 3 tons (71). 
As in France, the introduction of modern technology 
in the Spanish iron industry was the task of a 
entrepreneurial class which perceived and acted on the 
profit possibilities inherent in the combination of 
increased demand and the lower costs permited by the new o 
methods. But the protracted isolation of Spain and the 
backwardness of her economy produced fewer such creative 
entrepreneurs than in France. The Spanish counterparts of Jthe Wendels, the Schneiders, etc, were the exception rather 
than the rule. Spanish industrialists of the first part of 
the nineteenth century were isolated figures, operating 
against heavy odds, in a largely precapitalist environment o 
that hindered rather than fostered their endeavours. There 
did exist, however, a small group of innovators that 
travelled to England, France and Germany and learned to o 
imitate their neighbors. The best known of them are given 
in table 14 which shows their names as well as the dates and 
destination of their investigative trips: o 
J 
---------------------------------------------------
66 
[ 
Table 14 
Name Year Place 
Juan F. de Guilisati c1770 Holland 
Juan J. de Elhuyar c1780 Sweden and Norway
Tomas de MorIa 1784 England 
F. Casado de Torres 1789 England and Germany 
Elorza ? England 
Francisco Datoli 1798 Le Creusot 
Gregorio Glez. Azaola 1825 England and France 
Manuel Heredia 1840 England 
Jose Villalonga ? England and France 
Sources: P. Madoz Diccionario Geografico-Estadistico 
-Historico de Espana. Madrid, 1850. Vol. XI, 
pp.89-90. J. Alcala Zamora Historia de una 
I Empresa Siderurgica Es~anola: Los Altod~rnos 
de Lierganes y la Caba a, l622~34. Santan-L der: Centro de Est. Montaneses, 1974. pp.38, 
76, and 127. J. Nadal Op. Cit. p. l6Y. J. 
Sarrailh La Espana Ilustrada de la Segunda 
Mitad del Siglo XVIII. Mejico: F.C.E. 
1957. pp. 351 and 357. 
On the other hand, the need to attract foreign 
technicians to Spain had been recognized as a public 
necessity under the "enlightened" governments of the 
eighteenth century. In 1762 Bernardo Ward, personal adviser 
( , to the king Ferdinand VI, wrote: 
) 
I This[industry] , never can be learned unless seen in 
practice~ and thus the sure way of introducing it in 
Spain is to convince the government that affluent men 
who have had factories of their own should come from 
abroad. As far as good quality and perfection of 
operations are concerned the manner of obtaining it 
is to introduce the eminent foreign craftsmen in 
their respective professions so that by exercicing 
their craft here they will easily communicate their 
abilities to the local workers (72). 
-------------------------------------------------------------
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These recommendations had some effect, and a number 
of engineers and technicians moved to Spain. Although most 
of the time, the impact of the ironmasters remained 
anonymous, we know they were influential in the ironworks [] 
shown in table 15 below: 
Table 15 
Place Year Ironmaster 
La Cabada, Santander c1760 Jean Maritz, french engineer
San Ildefonso 1770 Dowling, irish ironmaster 
Soc. Eco. Vascongada 1773 D. Crou, irish " 
Factory of Trubia 1800 Louis Proust, french quemist 
La Constancia, Malaga c1826 Basque ironmasters 
" n 1830 French and Belgium " 
" " 1833 British ironmasters 
R. Cia. Asturiana de 
Minas, Asturias 1833 John Cokerill 
11 1840 John Manby ] 
Sources: P. Madoz Ope Cit. J. Nadal Ope Cit. 
J. Serrailh Ope Cit. 
The detachment from traditional metallurgical 
methods began in Spain in the decade of the l830's. In 1833 
Manuel de Heredia installed 3 tall furnaces operated with :] 
charcoal in Malaga (73) and another three tall furnaces were 
installed in 1840 in Malaga in the factory El Angel. These 
were the bases for the iron industry of Spain that, for more ]
than thirty years, had its principal nucleus in the southern 
region of Andalucia (see regional distribution of output in 
table 19 below). ] 
-------- -------
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Tall furnaces gradually substituted for the old 
forges. In 1840, the first tall furnace of the north region 
was erected in Trubia (Asturias) and two more in 
Gur iezo (Santander) and Bolueta (Vizcaya) in 1848. The 
consumption of iron doubled between 1830 and mid-century 
(74) in a process parallel with the diffusion of the tall 
furnaces. 
The main constraint on the development of the sector 
in this period was its dependence on charcoal. With scarce 
endowments of forests, Spain's lack of charcoal became a 
serious problem for iron smelting. The protracted scarcity 
of forest products in Spain is reflected in its price index, 
shown in table 16, during the end of the eighteenth and 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries: 
Table 16 
Price Index of Firewood in Spain 
Year Index 
1785 100 
1790 120 
1795 150 
1800 200 
1805 210 
Source: Based on C. Wilson and G. 
Parker (eds.) An Introduction 
to the Sources of European 
Economic History 1500-1800 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell Uni-
versity Press, 1977. p. 54 
--------
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Nevertheless, the lack of mineral coal and its high '] 
price deferred the shift from charcoal to coal. Until the 
1840's the quality and price of charcoal- smelted pig iron 
kept coke at a relative disadvantage. J--l I 
This situation was reversed during the 1850's and 
1860's due, in particular, to two factors. The first was 
the availability of high quality, inexpensive British coal ] 
at the northern ports of Spain. Shipped as return cargo',  
its transportation cost was extremely low; and even with a 
high import tariff its price was strongly competitive. The 
rJ 
!second was the beginning of the exploitation of the northern l.~ I 
coalfields of Asturias and Leon-Palencia. 
To the advantage of a lower coal price was added the 
']
technology of the new coke-furnaces. They used less than 
half the fuel per unit output as compared to charcoal 
furnaces(75). The relative prices, in reals per ton, in the 
different stages of production as for 1865, are shown in ] 
table 17: 
Table 17 !J 
Charcoal Coke 
One ton of pig iron 481 106 
One ton of puddled iron 170 58 ]1
One ton of laminated iron 84 59 
Source: J. Nadal Ope Cit. p. 173 
J 
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The estimate of average output given by Sanchez 
Ramos (76) , permit s us outl ine the slow process 0 f the 
disappearence of charcoal smelting in the Spanish iron 
industry as shown in the table 18: 
Table 18 
Coke-smelting Charcoal-smelting Percent coke-smelting 
Year (Thou. Tons) (Thou. Tons) over total smelting 
1832 3000 
1840 8000 
1850 5000 38000 12 
1866 27000 44000 38 
1897 32600 8000 80 
Sources: P. Madoz Op. Cit •• Sanchez Ramos La Economia 
Siderurgica Espanola. Madrid, 1945. 
In effect, the beginnings of coke-smelting in Spain 
were slow and plagued with setbacks. Since the unsuccessful 
attempts in the late eighteenth century, the first 
successful experiments took place in the late 1840's in the 
new ironworks established in the northern coalfields off
'-
Asturias and Leon-Palencia. The French Compagnie Miniere et 
Metallurgique des Asturiaes and the Sociedad Metalurgica 
Duro y Cia. of Asturias were the first adopters of the new 
method. The northern region of. Asturias became the center 
of the iron industry of the country until the 1880's when 
the production of the Basque region surpassed that of 
71 
Asturias to 
Spain. Table 
become the undisputed metallurgical 
19 exhibits this regional shift: 
center of ] 
Table 19 ] 
Reg ional Shares of Output of Pig Iron (thousand tons) 
Year Spain Malaga % Asturias % Basque C. % 
----- ------ -------- ------------
1856 15 4 26 2 13 3 20 
1860-4 44 12 27 12 27 10 22 
1865-9 41 3 7 16 39 10 24 
1870-4 48 2 4 24 50 10 20 
1875-9 52 3 5 27 52 10 19 
1880-4 116 1 1 38 32 61 52 
1885-9 168 31 18 130 77 
1890-4 173 39 22 
1895-9 273 52 19 225 82 
190U-4 340 28 8 59 17 244 71 
1905-9 388 24 6 64 16 - 302 77 
1910-3 410 68 16 333 81 
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Elaborated from J. Nadal Op. Cit. pp. 230-231 
,] 
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produced 
The diffusion of the Bessemer 
an extraordinary demand for 
method 
Basque 
in Europe 
iron-ore, ] 
especially by British ironwoks. Most of this trade was in 
foreign, 
capital 
coun try. 
mainly British, hands~ yet a large accumulation of 
under local control took place in the Basque 
By the 1880's, Basque and Catalan entrepreneurs 
] 
founded important iron and s~eel companies and laid down the 
foundations of the modern metallurgical industry in Spain. 
The export link with England was decisive. As a 
return cargo from England, the British carriers accepted 
J; 
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coal and coke at low freight prices. On their arrival at 
Basque ports, British coal was sold at a lower price than 
the coal from neighboring ports in Asturias (see figure 4), 
n and this situation was reinforced after 1869 when the tariff 
was lowered (77). 
l 
As noted above, during the last third of the 
nineteenth century, Spain annually imported between 40 and 
60 percent of her total consumption of coal. This 
circumstance made the location of the Spanish iron industry 
somehow anomalous as compared to the rest of Europe: iron 
was produced in the ore rather than coal regions. 
L 
As for the refining stage, the technical 
difficulties of working with coal were solved before those 
in smelting so that the diffusion of refining methods took 
place in the early stages of modern iron techniques at the 
same time that the first tall furnaces were installed. The 
ironworks of Malaga were the first Spanish adopters of the 
puddling oven in 1833 (78). 
From the southern region of Andalucia, the puddling 
method spread to the rest of Spain following the general 
shift south to north of the iron industry. The puddling 
system became the main and almost exclusive method of iron 
n refining and persisted even after the introduction of the 
Bessemer and Martin methods. Table 20 below suggests the 
diffusion of the puddling method in Spain in terms of the 
I
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number of furnaces and their approximate production: 
Table 20 
Year Number of Furnaces Production(tons) 
1833 10 
1840 20 
1850 40 11000 
1866 103 29000 
1897 48 56000 
Source: P.Madoz Ope Cit. vol.XI, p.89, vol.XV, 
p.163. J.Nadal Ope Cit. p.163. An appro-
ximate output of 27-280 tons per furnace has 
been assumed for 1850. It is consistent withlJ the average output of the equipment of the 
moment as given by o. Landes Ope Cit. 
p.176. 
The construction of the Spanish railway network 
provided less stimulus to the iron industry than in some 
u other European countries and the United States. Although in 
the long run the railway network helped unify the national 
market and expand the economy in many ways, the 
circunstances under which it was built partially explain the 
relatively slow expansion of the iron industry in general 
and iron refining in. particular. As a result of foreign 
financial pressures (79), the General Law of 1855 lifted the 
existing tariff protection for rails, equipment, and raw 
materials used in the construction of railroads. This 
resulted in a massive importation into Spain of all types of 
-----------------------------------------------------------
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iron products and, in particular, those used in railroad 
construction: puddled and laminated iron. During the peak 
period in mileage increase, 1860-1865, imports of puddled 
and laminated iron into Spain were more than twice the local 
output of all types of iron products (80). 
J 
] 
After 1860 the puddling oven began to be displaced 
by the Bessemer converter in some European countries. These 
newer methods of iron refining appeared in Spain later ih 
the century. The first Bessemer converter was installed in 
1885 in Baracaldo(Bilbao) by the company Altos Hornos, and 
the same factory utilized the only two converters that the 
country had at the turn of the century. Martin-Siemens 
converters expanded much more rapidly. They were introduced 
in 1892 in the same factory of Bilbao, Altos Hornos, and 
there were 12 at the end of the century. The relative 
weight of the Bessemer and Siemens systems in the output 
steel in Spain is presented in table 21 below: 
of 
I J' 
J 
] 
Table 21 
No. of Bessemer Output No. of Siemens Output ] 
Year converters (Th. Tns) converters (Th. Tns) 
1888 1 20000' 
1893 2 43000 1 47000 
1899 2 43000 12 70000 
1926 220000 390000 ,] 
Sources: J. Nadal Op. Cit. p.181. Sanchez Ramos Op. Cit. 
pp. 238-9. Fedz. Miranda "La Industria Siderurgica 
en Espana" !!2S.enieria l Construccion. Madrid, 1926. 
]r 
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By the eve of the Great War one of the iron-based 
industrial nucleii of Spain was well established. The other 
two, Valencia and Asturias, had to wait for later waves of 
industrialization in the 1920's and 1950's, but, as of 1912, 
the metallurgical sector of Spain had grown enough as to be 
described as follows: 
Currently, Spain's iron industry shows an strong 
activity oriented toward local demand. This 
movement, unprecedented in the history of. the 
country, foretells a substained growth of consumption 
( 81) . 
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Third Case: Italy J 
One of the outstanding features of Italian economic 
development has been the scarcity of natural resources on 
the Peninsula. In particular the lack of domestic fuel (see 
graphs 4 thru 7) inhibitited gravely the growth of Italian 
iron and steel industry for more than a hundred years and 
caused an atypical development based on technological 
,] 
premises somewhat different from those prevalent in the rest 
of Western Europe through the second part of the nineteenth 
century. 
Shepard B. Clough describes the initial obstacles 
of the Italian iron industry as follows: 
Of these reasons [for Italy's backwardness in the 
metallurgical industry] shortages of raw materials ] 
were undoubtedly the most crucial, for if the natural 
resources had been great, they would have attracted 
the necessary capital and technicians (82). 
G. Luzzato, commenting on the consequences of the lack of 
national unity, points out that: ] 
Italy found itself completely unable to keep pace not 
because the inadequacy of government or private 
initiative, but owing to the very conditions of life 
in the individual regions, called upon almost 
unexpectedly to unite into one State (83). ] 
These observations underline the need to take into 
account the influence of natural constraints and regional 
factors on the attraction and diffusion of technology and 
the accumulation of capital in Italy. No conventional model 
of growth can explain the secular backwardness of the 
Italian industry until the 1880's and the sudden and rapid 
l 
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increase after the 1890's. 
The time lag in installing British techniques using 
coke-smelting in the Italy was over a hundred years: but the[! technological advances in iron refining and steel making 
were incorporated at a relatively early date into the 
Italian ironworks. 
[J The structural composition of the iron industry in 
Italy prior to the political unification of the country in 
1861 was not very different from that of Spain. Small 
production units catered to limited markets using Catalan 
forges and hydraulic power. Smelting and refining 
procedures, fuelled with locally gathered charcoal, were 
interrupted frequently by seasonal variations of the rivers.o 
In Liguria, for example, an average forge worked only about 
a third of the year due to climatic constraints(84). 
The composition of local demand for iron products 
was, as in the Spanish case, traditional agricultural tools 
and home implements, but the level of consumption was even 
lower than in Spain. About 1860, while France consumed 34o kilograms of iron per person, Spain consumed 7 kilograms, 
and Italy only 6.5 (85). 
The lack of political unity and the difficult 
geography of the Italian peninsula created an initial 
economic disparity between the North (Lombardy, Liguria, 
Piedmont, Veneto, and Tuscany) and the rest of the country. 
o 
n 
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In particular, the flow of ideas that the "enlightenment" 
spread materialized more substantialy in the regions closer 
to northen Europe than in the South (86). 
The person-to-person pattern of technological 
diffusion also played a much more important role in the 
northern regions than in the south. The dominance of France 
over the Piedmont, and of Austria over Lombardy and Venetia 
facilitated relationships among French, Swiss, German, and 
Italian entrepreneurs. For example, as early as the 
mid-eighteenth century King Emmanuel III sent an official to 
investigate the German ironworks and technology (87), and 
similarly, in the 1770's the Grand Duke of Tuscany sent the 
scientist Giovanni Fabbroni on an investigative trip to the 
factories of England and France(88). 
Many foreign entrepreneurs and technicians 
established thenselves in northern Italy. Among them the 
best known were: the Falks, who entered the metallurgical 
industry in Como region: Pousard, who introduced in the 
1880's the Bessemer converter in Piombino and Florence: the 
Frerejean brothers with ironworks in Piedmont: the Mongenet 
brothers in Val d'Aosta: and the Balleydier brothers in Pier 
d'Arena (Piedmont) . In Bergamo, Lombardy, Swiss 
entrepreneurs were so numerous that they formed a colony by 
thenselves. J 
J 
c 
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Under these circumstances it was natural that the 
first signs of modernization of the Italian iron industry 
materialized in the North. The pudd1ing furnace was common 
n in Piedmont and Lombardy from the 1830's on; it was first 
adopted by the Ba11eydier brothers in San Pier d'Arena in 
1832, then by the Frerejeans in Annecy in 1836, and by the 
Mongenets in Va1 d' Aosta in 1839 (89). By the time of 
Unification the pudd1ing system had spread among the -small 
foundries of Liguria, Tuscany and even Naples The ironwork 
of Tardy in Savona, Liguria, had three furnaces installed, 
o bringing the total number to about thirty in the 1860's. 
It was iron smelting, rather than refining, that 
limited the development of the whole sector. At the time of 
Unification in 1861, the Fe1ice Giordano Report, 
commissioned by the Government, estimated total production 
of pig iron in Italy as 29,000 tons (90). Geographically, 
the ironworks were scattered over all the country. In the 
south the main centers were in Calabria (foundry Fernandea) 
and Naples; In Central Italy Terni, Tivo1i, and Ancona, 
Grosseto and Florence; In the North San Pier d'Arena,o 
Annecy, Turin, Milan, Como, Genoa, and Va1 d'Aosta. 
As early as 1843 the Frenchmen De Mai11and and 
Cai110ux attempted to smelt iron-ore with coke in Tuscany 
(91) from local mineral ore but·the initial efforts did not 
develop into a coke-based iron smelting industry until the 
turn of the century. 
------ --------
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Scarcity of mineral coal deterred the shift from 
charcoal to coke. In spite of the falling cost of 
sea-freight for coal its price remained higher than that of 
charcoal until the 1880's (92). The relative prices (in 11 j 
liras) of charcoal and coke before the Unification were as 
shown in table 22: 
Table 22 
Prices of Charcoal and Coal in Italy 
(liras per ton) 
,J 
Year Charcoal Coal 
1847 20.5 
1851 11. 5 16.0 
1852 11. 4 
1853 11.9 
1854 12.2 23.3 
1855 13.4 
1856 15.5 
1857 15.1 
1858 14.3 
, '1859 14.9 
".J' I 
1860 18.0 
Sources: L. Einaudi "L'agitazione inglese 
contro il dazio di uscita suI 
carbone" in L. Einaudi (ed.) 
Croniche Economiche e Politiche 
di in Trentennio. Torino: Eina- ]
udi~ditore, 1960. G. Mori La 
Industria del Ferro in Toscana 
(1815-1859r-Turin, ILTE, 1966. 
p. 560. . 
The price of charcoal was relatively stable and low as 
compared to that of coal. Under these conditions, the 
J 
----------------------------------
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smelting process in Italy remained dependent on charcoal 
until the beginning of the twentieth century. A marked fall 
in the price of coal occurred only after 1880; and, even 
then, the substantial price advantage enjoyed in other 
European countries was not available to Italian 
entrepreneurs. Table 23 below shows the price of British 
coal in various European locations: 
Table 23 
Average price of British coal at: 
British factories 0.7 liras 
British ports 0.9 liras 
French factories 1.3 liras 
Italian ports 5.5 liras 
Italian factories 8.0 liras 
Source: Arnaldo Sapori "L'industria 
e il problema del carbone 
nel primo cinquantennio di 
unita nazionale" L'Economia 
Italiana dal 1861 al 1961. 
Milano: Oott.~Guiffre, 
1961, p. 263. 
The average cost of coal for Italian producers was 
thus seven to ten times higher than for their British and 
French counterparts. Moreover, the difficulty of shiftingr, 
L~ from charcoal to coke was reinforced by the small scale of 
production and lack of capital. In view of this situation, 
the Menabrea Committee, appointed by the Ministry of Marine 
87 
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Affairs in 1861, concluded that it was appropiate to go on 
with charcoal furnaces as the main basis of the 
iron-smelting industry (93). In the meantime, the 
Tl 
techniques of charcoal smelting had improved with the J 
introduction of the blast furnaces in the northern part of 
the country in the early 1830's (94) and the gradual 
replacement of catalan forges by tall furnaces.  
Although, between the Unification and IBBB, seven 
new tall furnaces were erected(six of which were in Tuscany 
and the Papal Sta tes) (95), The decl ine in the numbe r 0 f ta 11 1 
furnaces and total output of iron represented the general 
trend in the Italian iron industry from the mid-nineteenth 
century. Table 24 shows this declining trend: 
Year 
1850 
1862 
1872 
1880 
1890 
1896 
Sources: 
Table 24 
No. of tall  
furnaces 
40 
44 
32 
16 
10 
4 
R. Romeo Risorgimento 
Output in 
thou. tons 
20 
29 
17 
14 ] 
7 
~ Capita-
lismo. p. 184. M. Abrarte "L'im-
piego del carbon fossile nella side-
rurgia italiana" Archivo Economico ,] 
Dell'unificacione-rtaliana. vol. 
XVIII p. 8, n. 1. B. Caizzi Storia 
dell'Industria Italiana. Turin: 
Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese, 
p. 266. 
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The tenfold drop in the number of tall furnaces reflects 
both the trend toward specialization on iron and steel 
refining and the increasing dependence of the Italian 
industry on foreign sources of supply of pig iron. 
u 
Imported scrap iron also played an important role. 
During the decade of the 1870's, Europe's shift from iron to 
steel and the replacement of new steel rails created a 
surplus of cheap scrap iron. Italian steel mills, 
especially those close to important seaports, used scrap 
iron as their main input. The use of imported scrap iron 
spread through Liguria and Tuscany, and also to Lombardy 
since the railroad lines connecting Genoa with the Po Valley 
were constructed in the 1870's. Thus, the lack of fuel for 
smelting and the low price of scrap caused imports of scrap 
iron into Italy to grow tenfold between 1870 and 1880. 
Until 1913 they accounted for more than half the total 
imports of iron for the refining industry. 
Table 25 below shows the evolution of imports of 
iron and their relative weight in the total output of pig 
iron in Italy: 
] 
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Table 25 
Imports of pig Output of pig Percentage of 
Year iron (Th. Tons) iron (Th. Tons) Output/Imports 
-l 
1886-90 116 13 12 J 
1891-95 102 10 10 
1896-1900 147 14 9 
1901-05 144 65 45 
1906-10 207 177 84 
1911-13 241 370 153 
Sources: I. Svennilson Growth and Stagnation in the 
European Economy. Geneva: United Nations 
1954. p. 259. In Project Mulhall, University 
of Texas. Mario Abrarte Op. Cit. pp. 20-27 
Dependence on imports was thus overwhelming until the end of 
the century, that is, when the first large scale pig iron 
production based on coke-smelting was installed in the 
country. ] 
The first tall furnaces operated with coke were 
built in 1900 and 1903 in Portoferraio and Piombino 
(Tuscany). They were the result of the intervention of the ] 
State in conjunction with Belgian financial interests in the 
Societa Miniere ed Alti Forni dell'Elba, leasor of the iron 
mines of Elba. As in many other aspects of the iron and 
steel industry in Italy, the intervention of the Italian 
State was decisive in the shift from charcoal to coke. 
After the coke furnaces of Piombino and Portoferraio new 
ones were installed in Terni, Genoa and Naples (96). Output 
of pig iron smelted with coke went from 160,000 tons in 1900 
to 245,000 tons at the eve of World War I (97): and the 
] 
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number of tall furnaces operated with coke reached 12 in 
1914. 
Together with the increased supply of iron, imports 
of coal grew dramatically. Table 26 shows the quantities of 
pig iron produced and of coal imported in thousands of tons: 
Table 26 
u Year Pig iron Imported Coal 1861-5 25 417 
1866-70 642 
1871-5 975 
1867-80 17 1,474 
1881-5 22 2,433 
1886-90 13 3,747 
1891-5 10 4,104 
1896-1900 14 4,516 
1901-5 70 5,634 
1906-10 185 8,613 
1911-5 377 9,723 
Source: I. Svennilson Ope Cit. p 258o In Project Mulhall, University 
of Texas. 
Although only one third of all imported coal was 
used in the iron industry, the increase in coal imports and 
pig iron production at the turn of the century reflects the 
impact of the modernization in iron smelting (98). 
),
U As noted above, the delay in the adoption of new 
methods in the smelting process, was mainly due to the 
scarcity of cheap coal. But, another factor was also 
I 
I 
fT 
\ 
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influential in the early specialization of italian industry 
in refining: the size of the firms and the relative cost of 
the more effient technology. Around 1880, the average cost 
of a medium size (50 tons/day) tall furnace was about a 
million liras. A firm producing wrought iron and steel and 
operating with iron scrap could achieve the same production 
capacity by purchasing a Bessemer converter at an average 
cost of 75.000 liras; that is, thirteen times less fixed 
capital investment. 
In early 1860's an Italian group of entrepreneurs 
sent a committee to Sheffield to get information on the 
Bessemer converter from Sir Henry Bessemer himse 1f . 
;mmediately thereafter, the new technique was introduced in 
Italy supported by a variety of governmental measures. 
Protectionist policies which reached a peak with the tariff 
of 1878; established duties of up to 42 percent for all 
industrial products, iron and steel included. In addition, 
generous rebates on imports for shipbuilding were offered 
and the large banking groups (Credito Mobiliario, Banca 
Generale backed financially the main siderurgical groups 
formed in the 1880' sand 1890 IS (Terni, Elva, I Iva). The 
support of the State also took the form of advances on naval 
orders at high prices (99) and the granting of the monopoly 
of supply for orders of the Army and Navy. 
The first Bessemer converters were installed in 
Piombino in 1862 and Florence in 1866. During the decade of 
92 
the 1860's the method spread 
than 8 converters) , and 
converters) (100). 
through 
Tuscany 
Lombardy (with more 
(with more than 7 
The main thrust in steel output, however, was linked 
in Italy to the introduction of the Martin ovens. The 
possibility of using scrap iron and less coal gave the 
Martin system a notable advantage over the Bessemer 
converter and made it more suited to the Italian situation. 
(] 
[j 
The first Martin-Thomas were introduced in Genoa in 
1884 and in Brescia (Lombardy) in 1885 (101). Pont 
Saint-Martin (Val d'Aosta) and Terni followed. The Martin 
system became the technological basis of modern Italian 
steel-making, substituting and then displacing the Bessemer 
converters. 
o 
With the introduction of the Martin system, output 
of steel jumped from 7 thousand tons in 1885 to 135 thousand 
tons in 1890 and the iron and steel industry emerged as one 
of the leading sectors of the modern Italian economy. The 
relative importance of the new methods can be seen in table 
27: 
o 
IT 
I 
] 
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]Table 27 
Number of Units 
Year Bes semer Martin Electric 
1902 2 22 
1907 2 42 
1912 2 64 5 
1913 2 67 7 
1914 2 61 9 
1918 2 79 
Source: M. Abrarte Ope Cit. p.31.B. Caizzi 
Op. Cit. p. 378 . 
The rapid increase in the use of electric furnaces, i) 
especially after World War I, was linked to the development 
of hydroelectric power stations in the Alps and the 
technological innovations in the transmission of electric 
power over long distances. Electrification marked the 
beginning of the end of Italy's dependence on coal as fuel, 
and laid the basis, together with the Martin system, for the 
modern steel industry. 
From a territorial viewpoint, the iron and steel 
sector emerged after the First World War with a clear 
regional specialization: the North (Liguria, Lombardy, and 
Piedmont) produced most of the steel (75 percent of the 
national total), Tuscany and Naples produced most of the pig 
iron (102). u 
--~-~~----~-------------------, 
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L In summary then, we can outline the diffusion of 
iron and steel technology in France, Spain, and Italy during 
the nineteenth century as indicated in table 28 below. 
[ 
rI . 
L_ 
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,]Table 28 
Stages of Diffusion of Five Major Technologies 
in Iron and Steel Making in France, Spain, and ,- 'I 
Italy during the Nineteenth Century l 
v 
(' 
The Nature of the Diffusion ProcessL. 
In all three cases we have examined, we can observe 
a temporal and spatial process of change. The nature of 
this change, its development and timing were determined by 
the rate at which new techiques were adopted. The unfolding 
of this development was the result of the interaction among 
the forces that pressed for the adoption of the new 
technologies and the barriers that withstood them. It has 
to be examined, therefore, in the light of a wider 
perspective than that offered by aggregate changes in the 
proportion of GNP invested, or the capital/output ratio. 
The process of technological diffusion was, as 
Nathan Rosenberg has put it, "at the heart of the growthL process"(103) of the three countries of our study, and it 
took place under different historical circumstances in each 
case. The dissimilarities among these three cases can be 
r-
I . 
L regarded as three different positions in the balance of 
power between the modernizing forces of the economic 
structure and the barriers to technological diffusion. 
( 
L The view of innovation as a continuous activity of 
improvement, and not as a discrete series of break-throughs, 
has placed some doubts on the use of the concept of 
96 
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application lag, that is, the time between invention and 
innovation. In the light of a "continuous" approach to 
technological diffusion, the wave of metallurgical 
techniques that spread over our three countries during the 
nineteenth century has to be cautiously viewed not as a 
series of inventions but rather as a flow of improvements 
over the original discoveries. Yet, for taxonomical 
purposes, three milestones can be distinguished: 
coke-smelting, the puddling system, and the steel 
converters.  
Within the structural approach mentioned above, the 
analysis of the spread of innovations would appear as a 
supply-side examination of the process in which firms, 
protagonists of the change, adopt certain new technologies 
as a function of two variables: the cost ratio of the old 
to the new techniques, and the potential profitability of 
the adoption (104). As shown by Charles Hyde for the case ] 
of coke smelting in Britain, the main element behind these 
variables is the shift in relative prices of inputs of th~
 
new technologies. The time lags implied in the diffusion 
process would be a function of the varying speed of reaction 
of the firms to the potential profits of the new technology 
once the ratio of inputs prices has shifted favourably to 
the new technique. 
However, this supply-side approach needs to be 
complemented with the institutional and political frame in 
98 
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l which the change takes place. As Rosenberg has put it, 
"productivity of any technology is never independent of its 
institutional context and therefore needs to be studied 
within that context" (105). The "symbiotic" relationship 
between innovation and its institutional environment, to 
which Rosemberg refers, implies the existence of some form 
of institution or group of individuals who realize the 
potential profitability of the new methods. and 
techniques(106) . 
In the context of our three metallurgical sectors 
the institutional role played by the entrepreneurs as 
innovators in the capital goods industry is emphasized by 
Rosenberg in the folloing terms: 
It is the producers of capital goods who have the 
finantial incentive and therefore provide the 
pressures (Marketingg, demostration) to persuade 
firms to adopt the innovation (which they produce) . 
Creating a capital goods in industry is, in effect, a 
major way of "institutionalizing" internal pressures 
for the adoption of new technology •..•• This is an 
extremely important activity in overcoming the 
inevitable combination of inertia, ignorance, and 
genuine uncertainty which sorrounds an untried 
product (107). 
So far as our inquiry is concerned, the role played 
by entrepreneurs was decisive and can by itself explain a 
good deal of the successful development of the iron and 
steel sector in France as well as the initial failure in the 
[ 
L. creation of a substantial metallurgical sector in Italy and 
Spain. 
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Under the umbrella of incentives provided by the 
French government in the form of subsidies, prizes and 
travelling grants, French entrepreneurs became the driving 
force in the modernization of France's metallurgical 
industry. It has been debated (108) , whether the 
self-financed family enterprise hindered rather than 
fostered technological change in France: but it was, in \~. '.J 
fact, the Wendels and Schneiders who adopted coke smelting~ " 
Dafaud and de Gallois, the puddling and rolling method, 
Wilson and Schneider the Bessemer converter. Furthermore, 
the influence of French entrepreneurs and technicians in the ,--1 
. I 
spread of new technology through the rest of Europe was of 
the highest importance (109). 
In contrast with France, the Spanish entrepreneurial ] 
class was small and somewhat hesitant in taking risks. 
Nevertheless that class existed and its main 
representatives- Heredia, Villalonga, etc- accounted for the 
first technical innovations of the siderurgical sector. 
The help of the Spanish public sector was not very 
purposeful and consistent. Tariff protection was weak and 
poorly timed as is shown by the 1864 tariff, granted after 
the railway boom of the early 1860's had passed. 
The role of the state was the key factor in the ] 
development of the Italian siderurgical sector. The State 
of Italy acted as the catalyzer of a long tradition of 
] 
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r skills and scientific activity. In effect, 
scientific institutions were set up in Italy as early 
as the sixteenth century. Copernicus was trained in 
Bologna for astronomy, in Padua for medicine as well 
as canon law; and Galileo, of course, was a path(.' finder in experimental science .•.. It(Italy) wasI 
r, 
however relatively slow to adquire the new 
technologies in textiles, iron and steam, which moved 
Britain into modern growth at the end of the 
eighteenth century, the United States and 
north-western Europe in the first half of the 
nineteenth century (110). 
But after the unification of the country during the 
1860's, the attempt at modernization and technical 
improvement materialized into a coherent tariff protection 
complemented with an internal policy of subsidies and 
government contracts. Among the results of this policy were 
the creation of the ironworks of Elba, Ansaldo, Termi and 
Ferriere Italiane, and the introduction into their workshops 
of coke-smelting, Bessemer and Martin furnaces for the first 
time in Italy. 
Central to the subject of technological diffusion 
are the methods through which the new ideas are diffused 
(Ill). In our three national cases, as in the rest of 
Europe during the nineteenth century, the main vehicle of1i information was personal contact. Impersonal ways of 
comunication such as scientific and technological journals 
often helped in generating interest for the new techniques, 
but the person-to-person pattern was required to convey the 
highly specific information involved in the area of machine 
technology. 
101 
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In the iron and steel trade, the kind of contacts ,, , 
",~J I 
ranged from industrial espionage -as in the cases of the 
Italian Fabbroni, the French Marchant de la Houliere, or the 
Spaniard Agustin de Betancourt- to the more overt ]! 
investigative trips of individual technicians-as the ones 
mentioned in the tables above. Even organized tours for 
larger parties, as in the case of the Italian committee that 
visited Sir Henry Bessemer in Sheffield (112), were used a~ 
a means of gathering technological information. 
Special mention deserves to be given to the role of 
the migration of technicians, in particular aft~r the 
post-Waterloo peace restored normal traffic between Britain 
and continental Europe. Physical proximity proved 
indispensable for successful technological transmission and 
for the kind of personal interaction that was required by 
on-the-job learning of non-codified skills. 
] 
The Pattern of Diffusion 
One of the most prominent features of the diffusion 
through Europe of British metallurgical technology was its 
spatial development and the regional patterns that resulted 
from it. It is significant at this point to distinguish 
between two types of diffusion phenomena: one, in which the ]
pattern of the information field remains constant over time 
and the diffusion is intensified within that field; the 
other, a wave-like diffusion process in which an active 
102 
front of change expands out from an origin carrying with 
itself the locii of subsequent diffusion. In this latter 
type of diffusion, as described by T. Hagerstrand(ll3), any 
r 
I
I
given time period is powerfully influenced by preceding 
periods and affects subsequent stages. 
At any given moment of time we can represent the 
degree of acceptance of a new technology as a line out of 
the geographical origin, decreasing with physical 
distance(114) . Conversely, and more appropiate for our 
purposes, we can represent over time the degree of 
incorporation into the productive system of a new 
technology. 
Thus, in the case of the adoption of coke smelting 
in France, the only method for which long data series are 
available, the diffusion pattern is like the one in figure 
(5). In the figure, the horizontal axis represents time and 
the vertical axis represents the rate of adoption as 
reflected by the annual rate of growth of the percentage of 
total output produced with coke!. In the absence of long 
series of actual data for the rest of the techniques, some 
approximations , based in the s>ame assumptions and partial 
data, have been attempted in figures 6 thru 9. 
As depicted in figures 5 and 6, the invention took 
root in France in the early 1820's. Its adoption reached a 
peak in the 1830's and l840's and proceeded at a declining 
L 
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Figure 6 
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I 
rate well into the twentieth century. With a lag of some 
thirty years the same pattern, on a smaller scale, is 
followed in Spain. Although Spanish data on coke-smelted 
pig are more scarce than for France, it suggests that it was 
during the decades of 1860-70, i.e., during the leadership 
of the coal regions of the north in the iron industry, when 
the rate of substitution of charcoal by coke was most 
intensive. After that time the rate of adoption declineQ 
and by the turn of the century the shift from vegetal to 
mineral fuels had been almost completed. 
In the Italian case, the start of coke smelting came 
fifty years later than in Spain and eighty years later than 
in France. Yet, its diffusion was more rapid than in the 
French and Spanish cases as manifested in the fact that in 
just one decade after its introduction, more than sixty 
percent of all pig iron produced in Italy was smelted with 
co ke (115) . 
In the other branch of the industry -refining- the 
diffusion of technology was also produced in a wave-like 
pattern. The adoption of the puddling method in France, 
Spain and Italy is shown in figure (7). 
It spread rapidly after the Napoleonic Wars in 
France and during the decade of the 1830's in Spain and 
north Italy. The predominance of the puddling and rolling 
methods in Spain's iron industry in the late decades of the 
] 
!J 
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] 
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ninet~enth century was one of the main char~cteristics of 
her metallurgy and one of the main differences with respect 
to Italy where the shift to more modern methods of steel 
making came earlier. 
J 
These methods, as seen in figures (8 and 9), were 
adopted in the three countries with a relative short 
time-lag after their invention ( Bessemer converter in 1854, 
Thomas furnace in 1879). Their comparative development in 
the three national cases shows clearly the structural 
differences of the industries of the three countries toward 
the end of the nineteenth century. The lack of preparedness 
of Spain's metallurgy is marked by the much slower 
absorption of the Bessemer and Martin-Thomas methods which 
were the basis of large scale steel production in Europe. 
'] 
The different timing in the three cases, or in other 
words, the different "wave lengths", correspond with the 
lapsed time between the transfer of the methods and their 
fully efficient implementation. In all three cases, the 
was determined by the barriers against the diffusion of the 
duration of that span of time, the "absorption lag" (116) 
methods. 
] 
] 
These different lengths 
identified in of stagesterms , 
Brown (11 7 ) in the framework 
conditions that determine the 
of the wave can be 
described by Hanham andas 
of the general economic 
absorption of technical 
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innovations. This approach, similar to that of s. 
Gomulka's Inventive Activity~ Diffusion, and the Stages of 
Economic Growth (118), would identify the lifting of the 
[ barriers against absorption of technology with the creation 
of an evolving and progressive institutional framework 
favourable to technological diffusion. 
According to Gomulka, in a first stage modern 
technology takes root in a few centers. The first 
metallurgical nucleii (Le Creusot, Malaga, Tuscany) grow in 
size and adopt the early innovations in the field. This is 
the "primary" stage of the wave. 
In a second step, the "diffusion" stage, the 
\
r original techniques spread to other centers ~f the 
, 
country(Asturias, Nord, Liguria). Adoption of innovation 
intensifies at these centers. Metallurgy expands at high 
rates of growth and leads the industrial transformation of( 
[,i the national(or regional) economies. 
Finally, in the "condensing" stage, the region is 
filled in with new centers(Basque Country, Lorraine, 
Lombardy) . Adoption of modern technology procedes at a 
constant increase throughout the region and, as a result of 
the industrial maturity, modernization extends into other 
( 
l sectors (locomotives, shipyards, machine-tools). 
In the case of the iron industry of our three 
countries, the centers that were finally reached by the 
111 
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innovation wave (Lorraine, Liguria-Lombardy, and the Basque 
Country) became, in turn, the most active nuc1eii of the 
sector. 
] 
] 
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VI 
Sununary and Conclusionsf 
The chain of technical improvements in metallurgy 
during the nineteenth century formed a continuous process of 
innovations. Yet, three outstanding inventions marked the 
evolution of iron industry in continental Europe between 
1820 and 1880: a) The substitution of coal for charcoal in 
the smelting of iron-ore~ b) the puddling and rolling 
process~ and c) the modern converters of steel (Bessemer, 
Siemens and Thomas) . 
Most of the innovation activity took place in 
British workshops and factories, and it was not until after 
1815 that British technology in iron smelting and refining 
spread to the countries of the Continent. The development 
of iron technology in three of these countries, namely 
France, Spain and Italy, provides relevant insights for the 
study of comparative economic history. Furthermore, it 
sheds light on the problems of diffusion and adoption of 
technological innovations, and reveals some of the 
shortcomings of the approach of aggregate growth models to 
the process of capital accumulation. 
France's ironworks remained technologically stagnant 
until the 1820's. The establishment of British ironmasters 
112 
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in France and the trips of French iron technicians across ] 
the Channel started the influx of British technology into 
the French iron industry. In the decade of the 1820's, the 
use of coke and puddling ovens were adopted in France. 
During the decade of the 1860's Bessemer converters 
were installed throughout the country. Le Lorraine's 
reserves of sulphuric iron-ore became usable from 1880 on :] 
due to the introduction of "basic" converters. Paralleling 
the introduction of new technology occurred a movement of 
displacement that shifted the main metallurgical centers of 
France northwards, toward Lorraine and the Belgian border. 
] 
In Spain's iron industry the influx of technological 
innovations (especially tall furnaces and puddling ovens) ] 
began during the 1830'5 in the southern region of Andalusia. 
It coincided in time with the disentailment of mortmain 
states and the expansion of the Catalan textile industry. 
For about 25 years Andalusia was the metallurgical center of 
Spain. The implementation of coke smelting in the 1850's 
shifted the industry's location toward the northern 
coal-fields of Asturias. A second shift ocurred around ] i 
1880. The abundance of phosphorus-free iron-ore in the 
Basque Country and the low price of imported British coal 
caused the gravitational center of the industry to be ~J 
d i spl aced to the vicinity of Bilbao and other Basque 
locations. 
114 
r The role of the Spanish entrepreneurs in the 
industrialization of nineteenth century Spain was important 
but much less influential than in the French or Italian 
processes. As in the French case, the presence of foreign 
technicians and the gathering of information by travelling 
abroad were the most important means of technical innovation 
spread in Spain. 
Lack of political unity and lack of coal were the 
two main restraints on the initiation of Italy's modern 
[, metallurgical industry. Modern methods of iron refining 
spread in Italy from the 1830's, but the use of coke in 
smelting was delayed until the turn of the century when the 
r1 
public sector undertook effective 
industrialization. Imports of coal, 
measures to stimulate 
iron-ore and scrap iron 
played an important role in the development of the Italian 
industry. This made the Italian case one of double 
dependence: on resources and technology. With respect to 
fuel, however, technology also provided an easement in the 
form of hydro-electric power. 
II ' Personal contacts and direct information were the 
main instruments of technological diffusion in the French, 
Italian and Spanish iron industries during the nineteenth 
century. This process of diffusion took the form of a wave 
that spread from north to south in Europe and whose timing 
and pace was conditioned by institutional forces and 
geographical factors. 
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The sequential stages in technological diffusion 
("p rim ~ r y", "d i f f u5 ion", and 11 cond ens ing ") can be id en t i fie d 
in our three cases as coincident with stages in the process 
of general economic growth. More specifically, since in all ] 
our three cases the iron industry was among the leading 
sectors of industrialization, the degree of absorption of 
technology in the iron industry determined its stages of 
growth and its leading role. 
Given the nature of the early iron industry and its 
1 in kages with the rest of the economic structure, some 
elements of the process of diffusion gained special 
relevance: The person-to-person contacts in the spread of 
information, and the role played by entreprsneurs as 
"institutions" of technological diffusion. 
In summary, we arrive at two sets of 
One relates to the diffusion of technology 
national cases~ the other, to the way in which 
dealt with in conventional growth models. 
conclusions. 
in our three 
technology is 
The diffusion of iron technology in the nineteenth l 
~...J
century in France, Italy and Spain assumed the form of a 
wave. That wave, spreading from north to south, caused the 
iron industry to shift from south to north. The wave's 
timing and speed were strongly conditioned by geographical J 
and institutional barriers, but also by the economic 
attitudes and ideas of the entrepreneurial classes of each 
] 
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country and by the economic policy of each government. 
The historical analysis of the evolution of 
technology over time confronts the complex task of including 
all these factors into models. These factors are present 
although often evaded in conventional growth models - an 
evasion accomplished by simply inserting a variable for the 
savings(investment) rate on the one hand, and an aggregate 
marginal capital/output ratio rate incorporating 
technological change, on the other. The analysis here 
r . suggests, however, that the cultural, political and 
L 
geographical aspects of capital accumulation need to be 
incorporated into growth model s by d i sagg r eg a t i ng 
"investment" and by investigating in great detail the 
sectors in which it occurs. 
f. 
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